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Abstract 
 
In 2014, the Child Protective Services received 3.6 million referrals alleging child 
abuse and neglect, of which, 702,000 children were victims of abuse and neglect and an 
estimated 1,580 children died due to maltreatment.  In addition to this appalling toll, the welfare 
effects of child victimization are substantial. Evidence suggests that compared to 
demographically similar adults who were non-victims, adults with documented histories of 
maltreatment are more likely to engage in criminal behavior; have adverse mental and physical 
health problems such as depression, addiction and post-traumatic stress disorder; and have lower 
levels of education and earnings. These essays contribute toward the understanding of the 
consequences of two very distinctive policies – mandatory arrest and medical marijuana laws – 
and their impact on child maltreatment.  
An important and controversial question in criminal justice policy concerns whether 
aggressive sanctions, such as mandatory arrest policies, serve as effective deterrents to familial 
violence. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical framework that models child abuse in which I allow 
for a strategic interaction between the child and his or her abuser.  The comparative statics yield 
clear predictions of the impact of sanctions on child maltreatment – as the cost and probability of 
external interventions rise, the probability of violence falls.  I follow this theoretical analysis 
with an empirical investigation of the impact of mandatory arrest policies on child victimization. 
 vii 
 
I find a statistically significant and positive relationship between states that have implemented 
mandatory arrest laws and reported child maltreatment rates. This may seem surprising; however 
there are two explanations for the results. The likely explanation is that reporting of maltreatment 
increased in states mandating arrest; alternatively, recidivism may have increased in these states. 
Evidence from the OLS estimates for the reporting of abuse and child fatality rates (a proxy for 
the true incidence of child abuse), demonstrates that the increase in maltreatment is not due to 
recidivism but, in fact, more people reporting abuse to the police and Child Protective Services. 
The most important result that emerges from the data, however, is that while reported abuse 
increases in states with mandatory arrest laws, the true incidence of maltreatment actually falls.  
The ultimate goal of this paper is to stimulate further theoretical and empirical research that 
focuses on child abuse and prevention, thus enhancing an understanding of how sanctions 
influence child victimization. 
The next chapter looks at one potential risk factor for child maltreatment –marijuana 
use and liberalization –using evidence from medical marijuana laws (MMLs). Chapter 2 begins 
by extending the current MML-crime literature by providing a comprehensive evaluation of the 
impact of MMLs implemented at the state level on reported child victimization rates. I show that 
specific modes of medical marijuana regulation differentially influence the magnitude of 
reported incidences of child abuse, a finding which sheds new light on the current literature. 
More specifically, using fixed effects analysis applied to data from the National Child Abuse and 
Neglect Database System (NCANDS) and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), I show that states 
that allow for home cultivation in addition to decriminalizing its use see a further increase in the 
magnitude of reported incidences of child maltreatment rates. 
 viii 
 
Since completing my dissertation, I have continued to investigate into issues that have 
implications for both theory and practice in my field. To that extent, I plan to analyze the slowly 
developing public sphere –a platform where culture and social change rely on both media and 
conversation. 
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Chapter 1: Interventions for Domestic Violence: Examining the Role  
of Mandatory Arrest Policies on Child Maltreatment 
 
Child abuse or maltreatment constitutes all forms of physical and/or emotional ill-
treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or commercial or other exploitation, 
resulting in actual or potential harm to the child’s health, survival, development or dignity in the 
context of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power.  
WHO Consultation on Child Abuse and Prevention, 1999 
 
Domestic violence in the United States accounts for an estimated 1,200 deaths and two 
million injuries to women each year (Black & Breiding, 2008). Early public attitude towards 
domestic violence was based on the belief that abuse was best handled within the family and, 
while injunctions were available to married women, criminal penalties against the spouse were 
negligible (Bourg & Stock, 1994). Recently, the feminist movement, various grassroots 
organizations and the research community have significantly shifted the way the criminal justice 
system treats and prosecutes perpetrators of domestic assaults. Several alternatives for 
appropriate enforcement in response to intimate partner violence have been researched, proposed 
and adopted as policy. These alternatives vary from doing nothing to more formal criminal 
sanctions such as arrests, restraining orders and coerced treatments (Fagan, 1996). For example, 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) was the first U.S. federal legislation to 
acknowledge domestic violence as a crime (NNEDV Safety Net Project and The Confidentiality 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
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Institute, 2015). It created new legal remedies and penalties (e.g. pro arrest policies such as 
mandatory and preferred arrest); authorized extensive grants to states, NGOs and federal 
agencies for various anti-violence programs; and created a civil rights remedy (Silk & Hurwitz, 
p. 6).  
Much of the research following the emergence of VAWA has focused on the effect of 
pro-arrest policies on recidivism rates (Hirschel et al., 2007). However, since not all pro-arrest 
policies are the same, policy effectiveness can be influenced by factors such as how the policy is 
written and implemented and the degree of support for and monitoring of such policies within 
the community (Browne & Williams, 1989). Many advocates view the actual arrest of batterers 
as the ultimate goal of mandatory arrest legislation (Fagan, 1996). Interestingly, to date, pro-
arrest policy research has been slow to examine the net-widening effect of domestic violence 
arrest practices (Hirschel et al., 2007). Initially, domestic violence statutes only applied to 
violence between couples. The definition today encompasses a wide range of relationships– 
current/former spouse and cohabitant, child in common, dating relations and those related by 
marriage or blood (National Institute of Justice, 2008).  
A great deal of research has focused on the deterrence of sanctions in the context of 
intimate partner violence, but few have examined the impact of sanctions on child abuse. Thus, 
the goal of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of this complex phenomenon by 
exploring the impact of a deterrent, such as mandatory arrest provision, on child maltreatment.  
Child abuse is not a new phenomenon; however, it was not until “the battered child 
syndrome” was published in 1962 (Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver) that 
researchers began to explore the etiology of child abuse. Studies have shown that children who 
are abused display signs of negative externalizing behavior, have an increased risk of aggressive 
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behavior, experience anxiety and depression, and may perpetuate the cycle of violence by 
increasing the probability that the child grows up to be a perpetrator or victim of domestic 
violence (Summers, 2006; Kernic et al., 2003; Lichter &McClosky, 2004). 
The magnitude of this problem is surprising. In 2008, the Child Protective Services 
received 3.3 million reports of children being neglected or abused, out of which 772,000 children 
were determined to be victims of abuse (Fang et al., 2012). According to the National Child 
Abuse and Neglect Database System, 1,640 children died from abuse and neglect in 2012. This 
translates to a rate of 2.20 children per 100,000 children in the general population and an average 
of four children dying every day from abuse or neglect. The average lifetime cost of nonfatal 
child maltreatment in 2008 was $210,012 and the average lifetime cost per death was $1,272,900 
(Fang et al., 2012). Clearly, the impact of child maltreatment generates a significant economic 
burden for not only the victims but also, by extension, for society. Thus, child violence is a social 
issue of concern for individuals and policy makers alike.  
The political potency of issues relating to child and other familial violence has garnered a 
certain urgency to the development of new laws and sanctions. Thus, this study seeks to answer 
the following research question: Do aggressive sanctions such as mandatory arrest and 
mandatory prosecution, serve as effective deterrents to child violence?  
In this paper, I develop and present a simple model of violence between children and 
their abusers. This is a Stackelberg type model in which the abuser (parent/guardian) maximizes 
expected utility subject to the stochastic reaction function of the victim (child). The comparative 
statics yield clear predictions about the impact of sanctions and deterrents on child maltreatment. 
The predictions are intuitive. As the cost and probability of external intervention rise, the 
probability of violence falls.   
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I follow this model with an empirical estimation of the impact of aggressive sanctions, 
such as mandatory arrest, on child victimization. I find a statistically significant and negative 
effect of these laws on child fatality rates (controlling for state and year fixed effects). However, 
while examining the impact of these laws on child maltreatment (controlling for state trends), I 
find a significant but positive relationship.  Although this positive relationship contradicts my 
model, it could be a consequence of an increase in the reporting of maltreatment and/or reprisal 
rate by abusers.    
The contribution of my paper is two-fold. First, I provide a theoretical framework that 
models child violence, in which I allow for a strategic interaction between the child and his 
abuser. In recent years, researchers have developed game theoretic models with respect to 
marriage and intimate partner violence (Manser & Brown, 1980; Lundberg & Pollak, 1996; 
Bloch & Rao, 2002; Tauchen & Witte, 1991); little attention, however, has been paid to 
analyzing child violence.  While no model can capture all the complex factors that affect child 
violence, my goal is to construct a model that generates testable hypotheses and stimulates 
further theoretical research, thus allowing for a better understanding of how sanctions influence 
child victimization.  
My second contribution is that I attempt to bridge the gap between the intimate partner 
and child abuse literature by empirically testing the effect of domestic violence statutes on child 
maltreatment. Literature on the co-occurrence of child abuse and spousal abuse has been 
expanding as more researchers are evaluating the impact of spousal abuse on children. As 
previously stated, none have evaluated the impact of sanctions on child maltreatment. Policies 
and laws have an important role in the identification and cessation of child maltreatment. Thus, 
 5 
 
in order for academics to participate in this important debate, it is necessary to evaluate which 
policies are effective at exposing and reducing family violence.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 maps the mandatory arrest and 
child maltreatment research that is relevant to my paper. Section 1.3 presents a model of child 
violence and examines the theoretical effect of interventions on child violence. Section 1.4 
presents descriptive evidence. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 present the empirical estimates of the impact 
of mandatory arrest policies on reported maltreatment rates and child fatality rates. Section 1.7 
concludes.   
 
Until the 1970’s, the criminal justice system tended to overlook domestic violence cases 
– domestic abuse was treated as a private affair and most police agencies discouraged their 
officers from arresting perpetrators of domestic violence (Bourg & Stock, 1994). 
Mandatory arrest laws, according to Iyengar (2009), emerged largely in response to two 
events. First, a court decision in Connecticut found the local police accountable for failure to 
adequately respond to a domestic violence incident1. 
Second, the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment was conducted. It randomly 
assigned a police response to domestic violence calls. Researchers found that arrest was the most 
effective method police used to reduce domestic violence. The other methods – counseling and 
                                                          
1 Thurman v City of Torrington (1984) Police took twenty-five minutes to respond to Mrs. Thurman's call for help. 
After arriving at the scene, the officer watched the attack continue for another twenty minutes before arresting Mr. 
Thurman. A subsequent civil lawsuit was filed against the town and the police department in 1984. Mrs. Thurman 
was awarded $2.3 million. The Thurman lawsuit brought about sweeping national reform of domestic violence laws, 
including the "Thurman Law" (aka the Family Violence Prevention and Response Act) instituted in Connecticut in 
1986, which made domestic violence an automatically arrestable offense, even if the victim did not wish to press 
charges. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
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separating the individuals – were considerably less effective at deterring future arrests (Sherman 
& Berk, 1984). This study was instrumental in spearheading research and policy evaluation for 
mandatory arrest laws. The results of this experiment were used by the US Department of 
Justice, academics, legislators, and criminal justice spokespersons to justify and support 
mandatory arrest policies (Mignon & Holmes, 1995). For example, the Violence Against Women 
Act was signed into law in 1994 as a federal response to violent crimes against women. Since 
then, according to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), 15 states have adopted mandatory arrest 
policies within the past two decades2. 
After Sherman and Berk’s 1984 study, several other regional experiments financed by 
NIJ (commonly known as the Spousal Assault Replication Program (SARP)) were conducted to 
test the deterrent effect of arrest policies on domestic violence. All the studies paint a complex 
picture of the effectiveness of arrest as a deterrent.  In 1992, Sherman, Schmidt and others 
conducted another controlled experiment using data from the Milwaukee Police Department. 
Their study revealed that while arrest deters repeat domestic violence incidences in the short run, 
there was no evidence of an overall long term deterrent effect. Moreover, they found a decrease 
in violence with groups who were employed, married, or white, but violence increased with 
arrest groups who were unemployed, unmarried, high school drop-outs, or African American. 
Similarly, Berk et al. (1992) used data from Colorado Springs and found that arrest did have a 
deterrent effect on employed batterers but not on unemployed batterers. In contrast, Dunford’s 
(1992) study on Omaha, and Hirschel & Hutchison’s (1992) study on Charlotte found that arrest 
was no more effective an intervention than mediation or separation. And finally, Pate & 
                                                          
2 Mandatory arrest policies completely remove police discretion and require arrest in all cases where officers have 
probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has occurred. No-drop policies require prosecution of a 
domestic violence perpetrator, regardless of the victim’s wishes (Wriggins, 2001) 
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Hamilton (1992) using data from Metro-Dade found that arrest only marginally affected 
recidivism after six months.  
The findings from these studies are merely snapshots and are limited in that they often 
include a single jurisdiction or small sample sizes. Overall, the studies failed to replicate the 
Minneapolis findings, and the authors reported inconsistencies in the direction and impact of 
arrest in domestic violence cases. Furthermore, when a finding of no effect is reported the 
readers have no formal way to assess whether the failure to find an effect was due to the absence 
of an effect or to the likelihood that the research design would not find an effect if it did exist 
(Garner et al., 1995). 
It is argued that mandatory arrest laws can result in a more consistent and punitive 
response to domestic violence; it is one form of state intervention that reduces the incidence of 
abuse and sends the appropriate societal message to abusers (Forell, 2013). Furthermore, it is 
hypothesized that those households residing in states with aggressive legislation tend to have a 
lower probability of domestic violence (Dugan, 2003). 
 In sharp contrast to the hypothesis that mandatory arrest laws may reduce violence and 
recidivism rates, Iyengar’s research found evidence to suggest that at the state level mandatory 
arrest laws increased the risk of intimate partner homicides3.  
Using the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports from 1976-2003, Iyengar (2009) 
tested to see if mandatory arrest laws affected the levels of domestic violence. A difference-in-
difference analysis revealed that intimate partner homicides increased by about 60% in states 
with mandatory arrest laws, but familial homicides declined in response to mandatory arrests. In 
contrast, there were no significant effects of arrest laws on homicides. Furthermore, the author 
                                                          
3 Maxwell et al., 2002; Sugarman & Boney, 2000; Pate & Hamilton, 1992; Berk et al., 1992 
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suggested that mandating arrest might not deter abusers from killing their victims if it decreased 
reporting by victims or increased reprisal by abusers.  
Iyengar’s study suggests that mandatory arrest laws may deter reporting, thereby 
nullifying the potential deterrence intended by the required arrest. In fact, given current penalties, 
the low probability of arrest and a high probability that prosecutors decline such cases, 
mandatory arrests laws may also have a negligible effect on future arrests and convictions (Sloan 
et al., 2013).  
Most of the studies have been beset with methodological concerns that lead to strikingly 
different estimated effects of arrest laws on intimate partner abuse. Thus, researchers and 
policymakers who are unaware of the differences between studies may make generalizations 
about mandatory arrest laws that cannot actually be supported (Zeoli et al., 2011).  
While the focus of interest in the domestic violence literature is understanding intimate 
partner abuse, more recent inquiry has sought to explore children’s exposure to domestic 
violence. Previously children were thought of as being tangential and disconnected to the 
violence between their parents, and commonly labeled “silent witnesses” (McIntosh, 2003). 
More recent qualitative research, however, has disputed this opinion as researchers have 
established the interconnectedness between men’s abuse of women and child abuse (Connolly et 
al., 2006; Cunningham & Baker, 2004; Edleson, 1999; Guille, 2004; Hester et al., 2000).  
McDonald and colleagues (2006) estimated domestic violence exposure at 15.5 million U.S. 
youth by calculating the number of children in two-parent homes where violence had occurred. 
 Children exposed to domestic violence may also be direct victims of maltreatment. A 
number of reviews have examined the co-occurrence of documented child maltreatment in 
families where adult domestic violence is also occurring (Hartley, 2002; Appel & Holden, 1998; 
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Edleson, 1999; McGuigan & Pratt, 2001; Bowker et al., 1988; Shipman et al., 1999; Stark & 
Flitcraft, 1988). Appel & Holden (1998) found that there exists a 41% median co-occurrence of 
child maltreatment and adult domestic violence in families studied, while a majority of the 
studies found a 30% to 60% overlap (Edleson, 1999; McGuigan & Pratt, 2001). 
An obvious question confronting researchers and policymakers is: what types of policy 
initiatives would promote a child’s wellbeing? In the early 1960s, with the support and 
encouragement of the federal government, U.S. states began enacting laws mandating the 
reporting of child abuse to government authorities. Some states mandated universal reporting 
while others targeted certain professionals (non-universal reporting). Palusci and Vandervort 
(2014) reviewed 213 counties in the 18 states that had universal reporting statutes. They found 
states with these statutes had higher confirmed report rates for neglect, but none for other 
maltreatment types. While universal reporting has been touted as increasing identification of 
children who suffer from child abuse and neglect, Palusci and Vandervort (2014) and Mathews 
and Bross (2008) suggest that additional reports made may not necessarily imply that more 
maltreated children would be found, especially for more serious cases such as physical and 
sexual abuse. Shpiegel and colleagues (2013) argue that the lack of sufficient evidence coupled 
with broad statutes, which may be ambiguous, can directly or indirectly affect the substantiation 
of reports. Thus, when state statutes do not provide comprehensive and understandable 
guidelines of what constitutes harm, substantiation decisions become increasingly problematic. 
To date, there has been little detailed research conducted on the impact of policies on the 
actual maltreatment of children. Certainly, a contextual understanding of the importance of such 
provisions on child violence and an empirical analysis that distinguishes child maltreatment 
cases from other domestic violence cases is lacking. As such, examining the effect of statutes 
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and policies that are meant to act as deterrents to child violence remains an issue to be further 
explored.  
 
In a seminal contribution, Becker (1968) showed that the most efficient way to deter a 
crime is to impose the severest possible penalty (to maintain adequate deterrence) and economize 
on the cost of enforcement (Dhami & Nowaihi, 2011). If we applied that proposition to the 
domain of family violence, would harsher mandates and policies effectively reduce the 
probability of violence? 
 A more interesting question is do most abusers intend to abuse, or is it an irrational act? 
If the abuser has an impulse-control problem, why would a harsh deterrent such as mandatory 
arrest or no-drop policy work? One can argue that deterrence works even for those with control 
problems because it brings to light the wrongness of the act. Consequentially, systems of 
morality and social pressure act as a deterrent. Moral intolerance could also impact legislation.  
State legislators that declare the moral impropriety of child abuse may enact stricter sanctions, 
acting in concert with their constituents.  
The following model is based on the assumption that there is a rational component to 
family violence. In this section, I present a simple model of child violence that draws on the 
previous work of Tauchen, Witte and Long (1985) who model intimate partner abuse. Like the 
authors, I view violence as an instrument for controlling the victim’s behavior, z.   
In a game theoretic context, I assume the dominant decision maker to be the parent, who 
maximizes his or her expected utility subject to the stochastic reaction function of the child. The 
parent imposes a behavior standard (𝑧̅) on the child and threatens a level of violence (v) if the 
1.3 Theoretical Model 
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rules are not obeyed.  Randomness is an essential feature in which violence occurs for 
instrumental purposes (Tauchen et al., 1985). The random term (𝜀) reflects random changes in 
the child’s behavior or the parent’s perception of the child’s behavior, or even the child’s 
misinterpretation of  𝑧̅ . If not included, the parent would set behavior standard (𝑧̅) and the child 
would either obey or disobey with certainty.   
In the remainder of this section I derive: 1) the child’s choice problem; 2) the parent’s 
choice problem; and 3) the resulting equilibrium. 
 
1.3.1 The Child’s Choice Problem 
To keep this model simple, I assume the child’s utility to be a function of behavior and 
violence, with z being the child’s only choice variable. The child evaluates his utility function 
before knowing the state of the world in which he will be in. 
Formally the child’s utility function is: 
 𝑈𝑐 (𝑧 +  𝜀, 𝑣) 
 
(1) 
            𝑈𝑣
𝑐 < 0  
Uz
c<0 beyond some z  
The parent sets the desired behavior, 𝑧̅ and inflicts a level of violence (𝑣) if the child fails to 
meet the standard. Note, this model only accounts for violence that is potentially criminal, 𝑣𝑙, 
where the CPS would deem as physical abuse or neglect. There are two types of parents that are 
not modeled here4. First, parents who choose to never be criminally violent or who would never 
resort to violence, ?̅? < 𝑣𝑙. Second, I do not consider parents who are likely to threaten violence 
                                                          
4 As stated before, I assume that there is a rational component to family violence. Therefore, by assumption, I am 
not modeling parents that are irrational or for whom violence is an emotional response. Since random behavior 
cannot be incentivized, any policy intervention would be ineffective. 
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before a policy intervention, but not after. The assumption being that these parents will have the 
same response as the parents for whom a threat is still being made after external sanctions or 
interventions.   
 Formally, the parent threatens to inflict violence that would be potentially criminal if: 
 
𝑣 = {
 𝑣𝑙 , 𝑧 +  𝜀 < 𝑧̅
0, 𝑧 +  𝜀 ≥ 𝑧̅
 
 
(2) 
I assume the child has a perceived probability density function, 𝑔𝑐(𝜀), for the random 
variable that measures the child’s misinterpretation of 𝑧̅. I also assume the distribution function 
has the following properties: 1) 𝜀 has a zero mean; 2) it is unimodal: where its first derivative is 
positive for 𝜀 < 0 and negative for 𝜀 > 0; and 3) it is twice continuously differentiable. 
Thus, the probability of violence (π) is:  
 
π = 𝑝𝑟(𝑧 +  𝜀 < 𝑧̅ ) =  ∫ 𝑔𝑐(𝜀)𝑑𝜀
?̅?−𝑧
−∞
 (3) 
For interest, I assume the case for a problem child, wherein the child’s behavior (𝑧 +  𝜀) may fall 
short of the required behavior (𝑧̅), 𝑧 +  𝜀 < 𝑧̅ .  
Then the expected utility of the child is: 
 E𝑈𝑐 = π𝑈𝑐(𝑧 +  𝜀, 𝑣) + (1 − π)𝑈𝑐(𝑧 +  𝜀, 0) (4) 
Maximizing EUc by the choice of z yields the following first order necessary condition for the 
child’s optimum behavior 
 dE𝑈𝑐
dẑ
=  −𝑔𝑐(𝜀)𝑈
𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 𝑣𝑝) + π
d𝑈𝑐(?̂?, 𝑣𝑝)
dẑ
+ 𝑔𝑐(𝜀)𝑈
𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 0)
+ (1 − π)
d𝑈𝑐(?̂?, 0)
dẑ
= 0                     
 
 
 
(5) 
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The nature of the problem implies 
d𝑈𝑐(?̂?,𝑣𝑝)
dẑ
=
d𝑈𝑐(?̂?,0)
dẑ
 . The child must choose a level of 
behavior before he realizes the state of the world, i.e. violence or no violence. Thus, the 
immediate disutility he gets from improving his behavior is not conditioned on whether there 
will be violence in the future. 
 
𝑔𝑐(𝜀)[𝑈
𝑐(?̂?, 𝑣𝑝) − 𝑈𝑐(?̂?, 0) ] −
d𝑈𝑐
d?̂?
= 0 
 
(6) 
The child weighs the cost of his behavior in terms of his reduced utility versus the benefit of 
his behavior which is the reduced probability of violence. For at-risk children 
d𝑈𝑐
d?̂?
< 0 so that 
equation (6) implies, 
 d𝑈𝑐
dẑ
=  𝑔𝑐(𝜀)⌊𝑈
𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 𝑣𝑝) − 𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 0)⌋ < 0 
 
(7) 
Behavior that the child enjoys or that is not costly i.e. Uz 
c  ≥ 0, never results in violence as the 
child obeys willingly or without cost. Thus, U?̂?
c  < 0 focuses on the at-risk children. 
Totally differentiating equation (6) with respect to ẑ and z̅ yields 
 
d (
dE𝑈𝑐
dẑ )
dẑ
 dẑ  +
d (
dE𝑈𝑐
dẑ )
dz̅
dz̅ = 0, 
or 
 
 
[
𝑑2𝑈𝑐
𝑑?̂?2
 − 𝑔𝑐(𝜀)
d𝑈𝑐
dẑ
+ 𝑔𝑐(𝜀)
d𝑈𝑐
dẑ
 + 𝑔𝑐
′(𝜀)𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 𝑣𝑝) − 𝑔𝑐
′(𝜀)𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 0) ] dẑ
+ [𝑔𝑐
′(𝜀)𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 0) − 𝑔𝑐
′(𝜀)𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 𝑣)]dz̅ = 0 
 
 
 (8) 
 
This yields the comparative static result, 
 
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
= {
𝑔𝑐
′(𝜀)[𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 𝑣𝑝) − 𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 0)]
𝑑2𝑈𝑐
𝑑?̂?2
+ 𝑔𝑐′(𝜀)[𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 𝑣𝑝) − 𝑈𝑐(?̂? +  𝜀, 0)]
} > 0 
 
 
(9) 
As the parent raises the behavior standard, the child responds by increasing his optimal 
behavior. 
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The child has a perceived probability density function, 𝑔𝑐(𝜀), for the random variable 𝜀. 
Thus, if  𝜀 ̅= 0, and if 𝜀 < 0, then we can eliminate children who enjoy behaving or for when the 
cost of behaving is zero (
d𝑈𝑐
dẑ
≥ 0). For such children, the cost of obeying the standard set by the 
parent would always be less than the cost of violence incurred by disobeying. Such a child will 
never fall below the set standard, guaranteeing no violence. This is not a problem child5. 
 Also, we can eliminate children who are always trying to please. If  
𝑑?̂?
𝑑?̅?
> 1 , then setting 
a higher 𝑧̅ would increase the child’s behavior by more than the set standard. This would result in 
the parent increasing the behavior standards, until the child was perfect. Children like this 
respond to the threat of violence and by exceeding any increase in 𝑧̅, eliminating the probability 
of violence Thus, our child of interest is one for which 0 <
𝑑?̂?
𝑑?̅?
< 1. Such a child naturally 
responds to an increase in the behavioral standard, but only partially.  
Next, I model the parent’s expectations concerning the child’s reaction to the rules.    
 
1.3.2 The Parent’s Choice Problem   
The parent’s utility is a function of the behavior of the child and the cost of sanctions 
(fines, imprisonment) given outside intervention,  𝐶𝑃. The cost of outside intervention enters into 
the parent’s utility function as it imposes costs such as legal fees, loss of potential income from 
being arrested, and disapproval and loss of support from the community  
                                                          
5 Another corner solution is a child who is always disobedient, i.e. 
𝑑?̂?
𝑑?̅?
< 0. For such children, the cost of behaving 
will always be greater than the cost of violence.  
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As with the child, I assume the parent has a perceived probability density function, 𝑔𝑝(𝜀), 
for the random variable in the child’s behavior. Let π(v) be the probability of violence if the 
parent perceives that the child has fallen short of the behavior standard.    
 
π(v) = 𝑝𝑟(?̂? +  𝜀 < 𝑧̅ ) =  ∫ 𝑔𝑝(𝜀)𝑑𝜀
?̅?−?̂?
−∞
 
 
 
 
(10) 
           Then, assuming external intervention occurs only when there is violence, the 
parent's utility function is6:   
 
𝑈𝑝 = {
    𝑈(?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0) 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑈(?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃) 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
 
(11) 
 
Let 𝜌 be the probability of external intervention when there is violence. As noted 
previously, violence reflects abuse and neglect that would be legally penalized.  
Formally, the parent’s expected utility can be expressed as follows: 
 𝐸𝑈𝑃 = 𝜌𝜋(𝑣)𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃] + (1 − 𝜌)𝜋(𝑣)𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0]
+ (1 − 𝜋(𝑣))𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] 
 
 
(12) 
 
Maximizing 𝐸𝑈𝑃 by the choice of 𝑧̅ yields the following first order necessary condition for the 
parent’s choice problem: 
d𝐸𝑈𝑃
dz̅
= ρ𝑔𝑝(𝜀)𝑈
𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃] + ρπ
d𝑈𝑃(𝑧, 𝐶)
dẑ
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
+ (1 − ρ)𝑔𝑝(𝜀)𝑈
𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0]
+ (1 − ρ)π
d𝑈𝑃(𝑧, 0)
dẑ
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
−  𝑔𝑝(𝜀)𝑈
𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0]
+ (1 − π)
d𝑈𝑃(𝑧, 0)
dẑ
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
= 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(13) 
                                                          
6 The parent gets disutility from the cost of sanctions U𝐶 
p
 < 0.  
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The nature of the problem implies  
d𝑈𝑃(𝑧,𝐶)
dẑ
=
𝑑𝑈𝑃(𝑧,0)
𝑑?̂?
 . The parent derives immediate utility from 
the child’s behavior that is not conditional on external intervention. 
Then, 
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
−  𝜌𝑔𝑝(𝜀)[𝑈
𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] − 𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]] = 0 
 
(14) 
 
This implies,   
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
=  𝜌𝑔𝑝(𝜀)[𝑈
𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] − 𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]] > 0 
 
  (15) 
 
That is, the parent gets utility when the child responds positively to the behavior standard.  
Totally differentiating with respect to 𝐶𝑃 and 𝑧̅ yields 
 
𝑑 (
d𝐸𝑈𝑃
dz̅ )
𝑑𝐶𝑃
𝑑𝐶𝑃 +
𝑑 (
d𝐸𝑈𝑃
dz̅ )
𝑑𝑧̅
 𝑑𝑧̅ = 0, 
 
 
[𝜌𝑔𝑝(𝜀) (
𝑑𝑈𝑝
𝑑𝐶𝑃
)] 𝑑𝐶𝑃
+ [
d2𝑈𝑃
dẑ2
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
+
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
𝑑2?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅2
− 𝜌𝑔𝑝
′ (𝜀)[𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] − 𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]]] 𝑑𝑧̅ = 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(16) 
Thus, 
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝐶𝑃
= {
−𝜌𝑔𝑝(𝜀) (
𝑑𝑈𝑝
𝑑𝐶𝑃
)
d2𝑈𝑃
dẑ2
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅ +
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
𝑑2?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅2
− 𝜌𝑔𝑝′ (𝜀)[𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] − 𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]]
} < 0   (17) 
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This leads to an important implication; the parent lowers the behavior standard (or raises the 
violence threshold) as the cost of sanctions increase7.  
Totally differentiating equation (13) with respect to 𝜌 and 𝑧̅:  
 
𝑑 (
d𝐸𝑈𝑃
dz̅ )
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝜌 +
𝑑 (
d𝐸𝑈𝑃
dz̅ )
𝑑𝑧̅
 𝑑𝑧̅ = 0   
 
 
 
 −𝑔𝑝(𝜀)[𝑈
𝑝(?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0) − 𝑈𝑝(?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃)]𝑑𝜌
+ [
d2𝑈𝑃
dẑ2
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
+
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
𝑑2?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅2
− 𝜌𝑔𝑝
′ (𝜀)[𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] − 𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]]] 𝑑𝑧̅ = 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(11) 
This implies, 
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝜌
=
{
 
 
 
 
𝑔𝑝(𝜀)[𝑈
𝑝(?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0) − 𝑈𝑝(?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃)]
[
d2𝑈𝑃
dẑ2
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅ +
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
𝑑2?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅2
− 𝜌𝑔𝑝′ (𝜀)[𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀, 0] − 𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]]]
}
 
 
 
 
< 0 
 
 
(12) 
Another important implication is that the parent lowers the behavior standard when the 
probability of detection or intervention increases. Thus, the parent takes the cost of sanctions and 
the probability of external intervention into consideration when setting the behavior standard for 
the child. 
                                                          
7  As the cost of sanctions increase, the utility the parent receives from being violent falls: 
𝑑𝑈𝑝
𝑑𝐶𝑃
< 0   
The denominator,
d2𝑈𝑃
dẑ2
 is negative by the concavity of 𝑈𝑝 ; 
d𝑈𝑃
dẑ
< 0; 
𝑑?̂?
𝑑?̅?
> 0;  𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧)̅ +  𝜀, 0] >
𝑈𝑝[?̂?(𝑧̅) +  𝜀,  𝐶𝑃]; 𝑔𝑝
′ (𝜀) by assumption is greater than 0. Thus, 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝐶𝑃
< 0; By the same logic, 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝜌
< 0 
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1.3.3 Comparative Statics 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝐶𝑃
=
𝑑𝜋
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
𝑑𝐶𝑃
= 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
 (
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝐶𝑃
− 
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝐶𝑃
) =
𝑑𝜋
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝐶𝑃
(1 −
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
 ) < 0  
 
(13) 
 
And,  
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝜌
=
𝑑𝜋
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
𝑑𝜌
=  
𝑑𝜋
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
 (
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝜌
− 
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝜌
) =
𝑑𝜋
𝑑(𝑧̅ − ?̂?)
𝑑𝑧̅
𝑑𝜌
(1 −
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑧̅
 ) < 0 
 
(14) 
 
 
 
The two comparative static results, equations (20) and (21),  are highly intuitive; the 
probability of external intervention and the costs imposed on the individual by sanctions, 
presumably could promote the reduction, or cessation of violent behavior. It would be less likely 
for the parent, or any abuser, to engage in violence if he or she perceived the cost of sanctions to 
be more certain or more severe.  Correspondingly, the theory predicts that implementing 
sanctions, such as mandatory or pro-arrest policies – where arrest is certain given the reporting of 
abuse, should reduce the true incidence of child maltreatment. 
This model can also be extended to allow for violence to be treated as a continuous 
variable and for variations in responses across victims. For example, as children get older, they 
may become more active and focused in trying to prevent or intervene in the abuse. Older 
children are more likely to strike back, leave or report an abusive parent. Thus, one would expect 
to see the probability of violence fall with children who are older and less dependent on the 
parent or the abuser.  This would add another dimension and depth to the model – the abuser 
responds to the age of the victim, reducing violence as the child ages. 
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The relation between sanctions and behavior is complex, and hence it comes as no 
surprise that the literature on domestic violence documents mixed findings on the impact of 
sanctions and deterrence.  The ultimate goal of this model is to stimulate further theoretical 
research that focuses on child abuse and prevention, thus enhancing an understanding of how 
sanctions influence child victimization.  
A theoretical model alone, however, is not enough to determine the relative magnitude 
and deterrent effect of sanctions and provisions. Thus, testing the effectiveness and evaluating 
the legislative impact of policies that try to curb child violence remains an empirical question. 
 
1.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
Deterrence theory asserts that the perception of swift, severe, and certain legal sanctions 
contributes to an abstention from or reduction of illegal behavior (Heckert & Gondolf, 2000). 
The comparative static result of my theoretical model follows in line with this theory, in that, as 
the probability of external intervention and cost rise, violence should fall. A mandatory arrest 
provision is one such intervention – arrest is certain conditional on reporting. As previously 
discussed, a great deal of research has been conducted with regard to these legal sanctions on 
intimate partner abuse; however, none have examined the deterrent effects of these provisions on 
child abuse. Thus, the primary focus of this research is to test the effectiveness of such sanctions 
on child maltreatment rates. 
State statistics about child maltreatment are derived from the data collected by the 
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS). The Children’s Bureau analyzes 
and publishes the data in an annual report that is available for download on its website. I use 
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these reports in conjunction with the data provided through Cornell University – the National 
Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN) to construct a panel dataset from the 
years 1990 to 2010 for all 50 states (exclusive of District of Columbia).This is the first study to 
evaluate multi-state and multi-year comparisons of child maltreatment across the span of 20 
years.  
NCANDS was established in response to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
of 1988. As part of the act, it collects data aggregated at the state level through an annual survey. 
The survey asks each state to report the number of children who were the subjects of abuse or 
neglect; the number of child victims of maltreatment by age, sex and race; the number of reports 
and investigations of child abuse and neglect; the number of child fatalities; reporting of abuse to 
Child Protective Services (CPS); and other statistics (NDACAN). I calculate maltreatment and 
fatality rates using census estimates for state population with respect to age.  
The Children’s Bureau defines child fatality as children who have died due to abuse or 
neglect, and victims of maltreatment as children who have experienced or who were at risk of 
experiencing abuse or neglect. Perpetrator is defined as a parent or caretaker who has maltreated 
a child.         
Police officers have three tiers of decision making power: full discretion (discretionary 
arrest laws); discretion with the state indicating a preference for arrest (preferred arrest laws); 
and little to no discretion (mandatory arrest laws). In determining the classification as to which 
states have these laws, I use the classification scheme from a study conducted by Zeoli et al. 
(2011).  Table 1.1 lists the legislative date for each state that passed mandatory and 
recommended arrest policies.   
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I control for state-year factors that are potentially associated with the incidence of family 
violence which may in turn affect the child fatality and maltreatment rate. Economic measures 
such as median household income and unemployment rates were taken from the US Census 
Bureau. Additionally, income-inequality measures such as theil and gini, and human capital 
index measures such as high school and college attainment rate, were taken from a state-level 
panel data constructed by Frank, Mark (2009). I also control for state crime levels for violent and 
nonviolent crimes as reported by FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, and I account for social controls 
such as divorce rates (Wolfers, 2006; CDC).   
Other controls include, unemployment rate for males, male-female employment ratio (US 
Census Statistical Abstracts); execution (Donohue and Wolfers, 2005); population density (US 
Census Statistical Abstracts); and share of prisoners to state population which may be indicative 
of police behavior and crime enforcement levels in a given state (US Census Statistical 
Abstracts). Table 1.2 gives a summary of the data sources I use in my analysis.     
 
1.5 Empirical Strategy 
1.5.1 Parallel Trends and Policy Exogeneity 
Prior to the 1980s, the statutory structure for handling domestic violence cases could 
charitably be described as a benevolent neglect of a family problem (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996). 
Since the late seventies, statutory changes have sought to mainly alter the official reaction and 
response to domestic violence. As noted earlier, there had been a recurrent exercise of discretion 
by the criminal justice system to avoid arresting and prosecuting domestic violence offenders. 
Current legislation mandating arrests have resulted from the interplay of pressure from feminist 
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groups, concerned legislators, and professionals in the criminal justice system (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 1996). However, according to the authors, this pressure was not due to the level of 
violence, but rather the perceived government treatment of offenders. They also argued that 
alternative reforms such as mediation were dismissed as inappropriate or sexist as American 
society became more conservative and punitive towards domestic violence offenders. 
Stark (1993) posits that the most important reason for passing mandatory arrest laws was 
to control police behavior; reducing the level of violence was only of distant concern after the 
desire to avoid liability from inaction. For example, after the case of Thurman v City of 
Torrington, threats of future lawsuits served as a motivation for municipalities to protect 
themselves from liability, creating the desire to monitor and regulate police intervention in 
domestic violence incidents (Stark, 1993).  This argument is further substantiated by Iyengar 
(2009), who suggests that the timing of arrest law passages is tied to the publication of the 
MDVE results, the promotion of these results by the Justice department in subsequent years, and 
finally federal funding of these policies after 1994. The preceding arguments collectively suggest 
that the motivation for most of the mandatory arrest laws does not appear to have been tied to the 
level of domestic or family violence. 
Another underlying assumption here is that no other event, beside the implementation of 
the mandatory arrest policy alters the temporal path of either the treated or control groups. My 
data allows me to test and relax this identifying assumption as I look for graphical evidence of 
whether the two treatment groups diverged before the passage of the laws. In Figure 1.1, the 
dotted line represents the mean of the outcome variable for the two states (Utah and Rhode 
Island) that passed the mandatory arrest provision in 2000, with the solid line representing states 
with no such provision. As observed in the graph, the trends for child maltreatment prior to 2000 
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are very similar across the two groups, lending credibility to the empirical strategy in the next 
section.  
 
1.5.2 Empirical Model  
Using a difference in difference framework, I exploit the variation across states and time 
in the implementation of mandatory arrest policies. This allows me to identify the causal effect 
of these deterring policies under the assumptions of parallel trends and policy exogeneity.  
My two main dependent variables are reported incidences of child maltreatment and child 
fatality rates. Since the nature of the database allows for some reporting effect, I expect the 
reporting of maltreatment to increase in states with mandatory arrest laws. However, following 
the prediction of my comparative static results in Section 1.3.3, I expect the true incidence of 
maltreatment to fall. I test this prediction by investigating the impact of mandatory arrest laws on 
child fatality rates.  The underlying premise of this approach is that, with or without intervention, 
child fatality is always reported to the police; it is therefore immune to the reporting effect.  
The explanatory variables of interest are states with mandatory arrest and recommended 
arrest laws. Since states with mandatory arrest statutes allow for little to no discretion by the 
police when making arrests, I predict a larger impact on child maltreatment than states with no 
such provisions.  
My choice of controls is motivated by previous domestic violence research. I consider 
state and demographic controls that could affect familial violence and the decision to report. For 
example, schooling, employment, and income may alter the perpetrator’s risk of offending by 
increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in violence. As a result, I expect a negative 
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correlation between these variables and child maltreatment. I also consider the judicial 
environment that may help capture the effects of deterrence caused by incarceration and 
additional policing. Finally, to allow for policies that are evolving over time, address time shocks 
and control for heterogeneity, I include state fixed effects, year fixed effects and state specific 
linear time trends.  
Comparing child maltreatment rates before and after the passage of mandatory arrest 
laws, I estimate the impact of these laws on maltreatment rates per 1000 children. I use the 
following empirical specification:  
 𝑦𝑆𝑇 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽2  𝑋𝑆𝑇 + 𝛾𝑇 + 𝜃𝑆 +𝜑𝑆𝑇 + 𝜖𝑆𝑇 (15) 
For each state S in year T, 𝑦𝑆𝑇 is the maltreatment rate per 1000 children; MandArr is an 
indicator equal to 1 if a state has the mandatory arrest statute in effect at year T, and 0 otherwise; 
𝛾𝑇, 𝜃𝑆 and 𝜑𝑆𝑇 are year fixed effects, state fixed effects and state-specific time trends 
respectively; 𝑋𝑆𝑇 is a vector of control variables.  The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1  which 
measures the effect of the mandatory arrest law provision on the child maltreatment rate.  
Column (2) of Table 1.4 reports the coefficients from this regression.  
Using the same specification as (22), I also estimate the regression where the regressor of 
interest is the presence of recommended arrest policies. The recommended arrest effect variable 
is defined as 1 in states that have recommended arrest laws in effect at time T. Column (4) of 
Table 1.4 reports the coefficients from this regression. 
 
  
 25 
 
1.6 Estimation Results 
1.6.1 Main Results 
Table 1.4 presents the estimates of the impact of mandatory arrest laws on reported child 
maltreatment rates based on the difference in difference framework. Each column represents a 
separate regression. I find a positive and highly statistically significant relationship between 
states that have implemented mandatory arrest laws and reported child maltreatment rates. The 
results suggest that mandatory arrest laws are responsible for an additional 3.33 children being 
reported as maltreated per 1000 children. The effect is relatively large in magnitude, suggesting 
that mandatory arrest policies result in an approximate 23.6% increase in reported child 
maltreatment rates8. This may seem surprising; however there are two explanations for the 
results. The likely explanation is that reporting of maltreatment increased in states with 
mandatory arrest laws; alternatively, recidivism may have increased in these states. Increased 
reporting lowers the probability of a child being abused. On the other hand, abusers may blame 
the victim for being arrested, thus penalizing the victims with repeat or escalating violence once 
the abuser is released.  
 To verify the reporting hypothesis, I use data from NDACAN to examine if states with 
mandatory arrest laws indeed see an increase in the reporting of child maltreatment to the CPS. 
Column (1) of Table 1.6 reports the results of these estimates. I find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship, suggesting that states with mandatory arrest provisions see an 
approximate 16.8% increase in the reporting of child maltreatment rates. In contrast, I find a 
                                                          
8 Note that reported child maltreatment coefficients are similar for the two pro-arrest policy states, as shown in Table 
1.12. The only difference is that the estimates are larger, albeit not statistically so, for states with recommended 
arrest policies. When comparing the two extreme policy states, mandatory arrest vs discretionary arrest, estimates 
from the OLS regressions  indicate that mandatory arrest policy states see a 24.2% increase in reported child 
maltreatment rates.  
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negative and statistically insignificant coefficient for states with recommended arrest laws. This 
supports the theory that in mandatory arrest policy states, the police and the CPS are recording 
more of the violence that citizens are reporting to them. Figures 1.3 and 1.4, show the trend in 
reporting rates to the CPS by law enforcement personnel.  
Although child maltreatment is the most comprehensive measure of violence against 
children, it may often go unreported. Since maltreatment mostly occurs in the privacy of the 
home, it may be impossible to know what really happened as important facts can be either 
concealed or go undiscovered. Child fatality (death due to maltreatment) can serve as a useful 
proxy and reliable measure of violent crimes towards children. Since the death of a child is much 
harder to conceal, it is highly unlikely that fatalities would go unreported.  Accordingly, I 
estimate the impact of mandatory arrest laws on child fatality rates.  
Column (1) of Table 1.5 reports the results using only state and year fixed effects as 
controls. Estimates indicate that mandatory arrest law states see a decrease in child fatalities by 
0.38 children per 100,000 children.9 This corresponds to a 21% reduction in child fatality rates in 
states with mandatory arrest laws compared to states with no such policies. The results are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, as column (2) shows, the addition of a 
state-specific time trend to the model lessens the effect of these laws and makes the estimates 
indistinguishable from zero (from -0.38 and 5 percent significance to -0.051 and insignificant). It 
                                                          
9 When comparing the two extreme policy states, mandatory arrest policies to discretionary arrest policies Table 
1.13 (column 8)), I find that states with mandatory arrest laws see a 22% decrease in child fatality rates (controlling 
for state and year fixed effects). The results are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. I also find a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between pro-arrest policy states (i.e. states with either mandatory or 
recommended arrest) and child fatality rates, again controlling for year and state fixed effects.  
On the other hand, when examining only recommended arrest policy states (Table 1.13, (Columns 3-4 & 7&8)) I 
consistently find that no statistically significant relationship to fatality rates exists. However, because of the 
magnitude of the coefficients, an economically significant relationship exists. This suggests that when some 
intervention is introduced, a reduction in the actual incidence of child maltreatment can be realized. 
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is important to note that the model specified in column (1) underscores the magnitude and 
economic significance of mandatory arrest statutes’ impact on child fatality rates. Thus, using 
fatality as a proxy for child maltreatment yields valuable information about the true victimization 
rate of children.   
My second hypothesis assumes that the increase in maltreatment rates may be due to an 
increase in the recurrence of child maltreatment. Figure 1.5 looks at the trend in recurrence 
within six months of offending from the years 2000 to 2010.  One important characteristic can be 
seen. There seems to be a general reduction in the risk of recidivism over time. However, this 
may not be the result of any particular intervention. In fact, the high rate of offending observed 
immediately after the original event is a result of the high-risk people recidivating quickly, 
leaving the remaining sample in the risk set (medium and low risk individuals) to recidivate at 
different points in time (Kurlychek et al., 2012).  
There is also a lack of consensus in the domestic violence literature as to the 
effectiveness of these laws on recidivism rates. In fact, most research indicates that arrest may 
have an effect in delaying or reducing intimate partner recidivism. Combining data from all five 
replication (SARP) studies, Maxwell and colleagues (2001) concluded that arrest only slightly 
reduced recidivism. Additionally, Hilton and colleagues (2007) find that by arresting higher-risk 
perpetrators a small beneficial effect of arrest, possibly in delaying recidivism, can be realized. 
In sum, to reduce recidivism, the best available evidence suggests that a police response, 
particularly one that results in an arrest, is the most effective offender-focused solution (Maxwell 
& Robinson, 2014).  
Although it is likely that both the reporting of abuse and recidivism are operating, I find 
no strong evidence to suggest that states with mandatory arrest provisions see an increase in the 
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risk of recurrence. Collectively, I view these findings as compelling evidence to support the 
hypothesis that states with mandatory arrest laws not only see an increase in the reporting of 
abuse but also a decrease in the true incidence of maltreatment. 
  Having established that mandatory arrest laws have a significant impact on overall child 
maltreatment, I now estimate the effect of these laws stratified by age of the victims. One 
extension of my theoretical model is that as children get older, they may become more active in 
trying to prevent or intervene in the abuse. Abused children entering school age also have a 
higher probability of being detected by concerned outsiders, thereby reducing the physical 
contact between the abuser and the child. When I stratify by age (Table 1.7), I find that the 
impact of mandatory arrest laws is considerably stronger for older victims.10 The estimates 
however are insignificant, regardless of age. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that as children get older, their abuse has a higher probability of being detected and reported.   
 
1.6.2 Robustness Checks 
Table (1.4) columns 7-9 estimate the sensitivity of the results to an alternate 
specification. Since the maltreatment rate data is intrinsically a count of child victims subjected 
to abuse within a discrete time period, I use the negative binomial likelihood function as a 
robustness check to estimate the original specification11. The corresponding regression estimates 
                                                          
10 Estimates from the OLS regressions in Table 7 suggests mandatory arrest policy states see a 11% increase in 
maltreatment rates for victims between ages 0 and 3, and a 20.4% increase in reported maltreatment for older 
school-age victims, i.e. 4-11. As with the case of mandatory arrest policies, I find no statistically significant 
relationship exists between recommended arrest policy states and maltreatment rates stratified by age groups.  
11 The Poisson likelihood function assumes that the expected number of maltreatment rate is equal to its variance. If 
the variance is greater than the mean, then the resulting covariance matrix will be biased downward, and 
significance levels can be inflated (Liao 1994).  The variance of the child maltreatment rate is nearly 10 times larger 
than the mean. I therefore rejected the Poisson model due to over-dispersion. The negative binomial distribution can 
be thought of as a Poisson distribution with unobserved heterogeneity which can be conceptualized as a mixture of 
two probability distributions, Poisson and Gamma (Schlattmann, 2009) 
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and patterns of statistical significance are similar across both models. Evidence from the negative 
binomial regression serves as a check on the linear results rather than an alternative to the 
difference in difference estimation.  
I now conduct other robustness checks to analyze the plausibility of the identifying 
assumption. First, it may be that the adoption of mandatory arrest policies coincides with the 
adoption of other laws that address family violence, in which case my estimate could suffer from 
omitted variable bias. To address this, I run a negative binomial regression and I include controls 
for other state statutes such as ‘hard’ no-drop prosecution and universal reporting laws12. Table 
1.9 reports the estimates of these coefficients. Of these additional controls, none have a 
statistically significant impact on child maltreatment. More importantly, the inclusion of these 
other policies does not reduce the statistical significance and positive effect of mandatory arrest 
laws on child maltreatment rates.  
Second, there may be a concern that changes in maltreatment rates preceded the 
mandatory arrest policies. To address this, I create a placebo indicator which pretends that the 
treatment takes place one year earlier. Accordingly, I run a difference in difference and negative 
binomial regression.  Table 1.10 reports the results from the estimation. All estimated 
coefficients are insignificant and close to zero. Thus, the placebo treatment does not influence 
changes in child maltreatment rates. This specification adds plausibility to the assumption that 
                                                          
 
12 A hard no drop policy limits the prosecutor's discretion to drop a case solely because the victim is unwilling to 
cooperate. Hard no drop prosecution states are Utah, Wisconsin, Florida, and Minnesota.  
Sixteen states specify not only certain professionals who must report suspected abuse but also require all persons to 
report suspected abuse or neglect, regardless of profession. Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, 
and Utah. (Source: National conference of state legislatures) 
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the maltreatment rates of states with and without mandatory arrest provisions follow a similar 
trend before the treatment. 
Finally, there may be an interaction effect between arrest and certain demographic 
characteristics of the perpetrator such as the male and female unemployment rate, income, 
divorce and education. The estimates in Table 1.11 include these potential mechanisms, the 
policy change (states with mandatory arrest laws), and the interaction between the two terms. In 
the presence of unemployment, mandatory arrest seems to be a promising treatment and seems to 
deter all unemployed suspects. This result is of interest because unemployment by many is 
thought to increase spousal violence (Berk et al., 1992).  Columns 5, 6 and 7 estimate the 
interactions of education, income and divorce. While all three estimates have negative signs, 
none are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Motivated by the cyclicality of abusive relationships in a domestic setting, this paper 
investigates the causal effect of policy interventions on children who are abused. The theory is 
premised on a simple hypothesis of deterrence, predicting that sanctions that are certain and 
severe contribute to the overall decline in observed child maltreatment. One example of such a 
sanction is a mandatory arrest provision, i.e. a policy that makes arrests certain conditional on 
reporting. Using data from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System from 1990 
through 2010, I empirically test the impact of these laws on child maltreatment rates. I find that 
reported maltreatment rates increased in states with mandatory arrest laws. Evidence from the 
OLS estimates for child fatality rates demonstrates that the increase in reported maltreatment is 
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not due to recidivism but, in fact, more people reporting child abuse to the CPS and law 
enforcement. The most important result that emerges from the data, however, is that while 
reported abuse increases in states with mandatory arrest laws, the true incidence of maltreatment 
actually falls. 
It is also important to note that variations across counties in a state, along with their 
actual procedural implementation may differ and inadvertently bias my results. Additional 
studies of what happens within and among states over time will help determine the true impact of 
mandated arrest laws on child maltreatment. Also, once data with more heterogeneous groups of 
victims and longer follow-up periods become available, I suggest further investigation into the 
impact of interventions on the recurrence of child abuse.  
This, and other future research, documenting the impact of various laws and their impact 
on abused children can help legislators design customized policies to meet the needs of victims. 
More importantly, continued cooperation between society and the criminal justice system to help 
identify and prosecute perpetrators is needed to address the pervasive problem of child 
victimization.  
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Figure 1.1 Parallel Trends  
Notes: Figures plot group-specific yearly averages for maltreatment rate. 
Passed Policy in 2000 states includes Utah and Rhode Island. “No Policy” states are states which had no mandatory 
arrest policies in place by 2010. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Trends in Child Maltreatment Rates, States with Mandatory Arrest Laws 
 
Notes and Sources: Data is from the Child Maltreatment Reports and the National Data Archive for Child Abuse and 
Neglect (NDACAN). The Dashed line marks the timing of the mandatory arrest provision. As of 2010, 15 states 
have implemented mandatory arrest policies. 
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Figure 1.3 Report Source to CPS: Law Enforcement Personnel (percent) 
For the solid line, the “zero” marker on the X-axis indicates the year in which the state passed the mandatory arrest 
policy. The non-solid lines, the “zero” marker on the X-axis indicates the year in which the state passed the 
recommended arrest policy. See Table 1.1 for state-specific legislative dates. 
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Figure 1.4 General Trend in the Reporting of Child Abuse by Law Enforcement 
 
 
Figure 1.5 General Trend in Percent Recurrence of Abuse within 6 months (1999-2010) 
Note: Figure 1.4 shows a general trend in the reporting of child abuse from 1990-2010. Figure 1.5 shows the general 
trend in the recurrence of abuse from 1999-2010. The solid line indicates states which have passed mandatory arrest 
laws. The non-solid lines represent reporting rates of states that have discretionary and recommended arrest policies. 
See Table 1.1 for state-specific legislative dates. 
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For the solid line, the “zero” marker on the X-axis indicates the year in which the state passed the mandatory arrest 
policy. The non-solid lines, the “zero” marker on the X-axis indicates the year in which the state passed the 
recommended arrest policy. See Table 1.1 for state-specific legislative dates. 
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Victimization Rates/1000 children: By Age
 
Figure 1.6 Victimization Rates per 1,000 Children, by Age Cohort 
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For the solid line, the “zero” marker on the X-axis indicates the year in which the state passed the mandatory 
arrest policy. The non-solid lines, the “zero” marker on the X-axis indicates the year in which the state passed the 
recommended arrest policy. See Table 1.1 for state-specific legislative dates. 
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Figure 1.7 Victimization Rates per 1,000 Children, by Gender  
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Figure 1.8 Perpetrators by Relationship to Victims (2010) & Victims by Age Cohort (2010) 
Source: Child Maltreatment Report (2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Reported Maltreatment by Type (2010) 
Source: Child Maltreatment Report (2010) 
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Table 1.1 States with Mandatory Arrest, Recommended Arrest and Discretionary Arrest Policies 
State Policy State Policy 
AL Discretionary NE Discretionary 
AK Mandatory 1996 NV Mandatory 1989 
AZ Recommended 1991 NH Discretionary 
AR Discretionary NJ Mandatory 1991 
CA Recommended 1993 NM Discretionary 
CO Mandatory 1994 NY Recommended 1994 
CT  Mandatory 1987 NC Discretionary 
DC Mandatory 1991 ND Discretionary 
DE Discretionary OH Recommended 1994 
FL Discretionary OK Discretionary 
GA Discretionary OR Mandatory 2001 
HI Discretionary PA Discretionary 
ID Discretionary RI Mandatory 2000 
IL Discretionary SC Recommended 2002 
IN Discretionary SD Mandatory 1998 
IA Mandatory 1990  TN Discretionary 
KS Recommended 2000  TX Discretionary 
KY Discretionary UT Mandatory 2000 
LA Discretionary VT Discretionary 
ME Mandatory 1995 VA Mandatory 2002 
MD Discretionary   WA Mandatory 1999 
MA Discretionary   WV Discretionary 
MI Discretionary WI Mandatory 1996 
MN Discretionary   WY Discretionary 
MS Recommended 1995   
MO Recommended 1989   
MT Discretionary   
   
Source: Zeoli et al. (2009) 
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Table 1.2 Summary of Data Sources 
 
Variables Definitions Sources and years 
Dependent Variables   
Child maltreatment 
 
Children who have experienced 
or who were at risk of 
experiencing abuse or neglect. 
NDACAN (1990-1999) 
Children’s Bureau (2000-2010) 
Child fatality rate 
 
Children who have died due to 
abuse or neglect 
Reporting of maltreatment A report source is defined as the 
category or role of the person 
who notified a CPS agency of the 
alleged child maltreatment 
Explanatory variables of Interest  
Classification of states with mandatory 
arrest and recommended arrest 
provisions 
Mandatory arrest states are states 
which require an arrest 
conditional on a report of 
domestic violence.  
Recommended arrest states are 
states where officers are 
instructed but not required to 
make a warrantless arrest. 
Zeoli et al.  2011 “Mandatory, 
Preferred, or Discretionary: How 
the classification of Domestic 
violence warrantless arrest laws 
impact their estimated effects on 
intimate partner homicide” 
Family and State Environment   
Employment population ratio 
Male unemployment rate 
Unemployment rate 
Median Household income 
Poverty rate 
Population density per square mile 
(Proxy for urban rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Total population/ Land area) 
U.S. Census Bureau - Statistical 
Abstracts Series, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
  
Divorce rate  Wolfers, Justin. 2006.  Did 
Unilateral Divorce Raise 
Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation 
and New Results (1990 – 2000) 
CDC divorce rates (2000-2010) 
Fraction of child population that is white 
Fraction of child population that is black 
Information about the victim’s 
race 
U.S Census Bureau -Current 
Population Surveys 
College attainment rate 
High school attainment rate 
 
Theil index  
Human Capital Index Measures Frank, Mark. W. 2009 "Income 
Inequality, Human Capital, and 
Income Growth: Evidence from 
a State-Level VAR Analysis." 
 
 
Income-Inequality Index 
State Judicial Environment   
Death penalty & execution rate  Wolfers, Justin. 2006. Uses and 
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in 
the Death Penalty Debate 
U.S. Census Bureau - Statistical 
Abstracts Series 
Incarceration rates Prisoner to population ratio 
Crime rate Crime to population ratio FBI Uniform Crime Report 
(1990-2010) 
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Maltreatment rate per 1000 children 968 14.15387 8.22681 0.688966 82.62695 
Victims ages 0-3 960 15.55099 8.962154 1.072743 113.9011 
Victims ages 4-11 960 12.48899 7.530598 1.158864 95.88476 
Victims ages 12-15 960 11.36321 6.924545 1.169128 88.93894 
Reporting rate per 1,000 persons 953 6.92981 2.827277 1.777521 29.07375 
Fatality rate per 100,000 children 963 1.770668 1.079786 0 7.863395 
      
State-year controls:      
Divorce rate 865 4.384362 1.208081 2 10.8 
Median household income (2012) 1050 52819.17 8417.866 32018 77506 
High school attainment rate 1050 0.543162 0.04365 0.385799 0.637845 
College attainment rate 1050 0.160779 0.040332 0.07519 0.342751 
Employment population ratio 850 63.70447 4.400458 49.1 73.3 
Unemployment rate, males 850 5.650471 2.125332 2 15.8 
Execution rate 950 0.037048 0.096375 0 0.961847 
Prisoner to population ratio 1050 0.003491 0.001509 0.000444 0.008856 
Total crime to population ratio 1050 0.009219 0.004609 0.001307 0.024887 
Population density per sq. mi. 1050 180.3238 245.2472 0.96 1186.41 
Fraction of child pop. that is black 1023 0.128014 0.114996 0.003415 0.469574 
Fraction of child pop. that is white 1023 0.699382 0.190164 0.127249 1.023237 
Theil index 1050 0.756171 0.173633 0.443031 1.487246 
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Table 1.4 Effect of Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws on Child Maltreatment Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Child Maltreatment Rate per 1000 children  
Dependent variable mean 14.154       
       
Mandatory arrest law 
effect 
1.558 3.334**    0.1689**   
(0.969) (1.566)    (0 .0755)   
Recommended arrest law 
effect 
  2.8043 5.0243    0.2049  
  (2.855) (4.483)    (0.1797)  
Mand or Recom  
arrest law effect 
    2.019* 3.961**   0.217** 
    (1.089) (1.761)   (0.093) 
          
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin Neg. Bin 
Controls for other violent 
crimes 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year economic & 
social controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographic 
controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 
          
Observations 588 588 549 549 547 547 588 549 547 
R-squared 0.697 0.774 0.704 0.772 0.712 0.784 - - - 
Notes:  
The dependent variable for each column is the column title per 1000 children. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant 
at the .01, .05 .1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, *.  
Mandatory arrest states are states which require an arrest conditional on a report of domestic violence. Recommended arrest states are states where officers are 
instructed but not required to make a warrantless arrest when a domestic violence offense is reported.  
Mand or Recom arr states are states with either mandatory arrest or recommended arrest statutes. 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime 
variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  
State economic control variables include the variables: male unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and state median household income (BLS and 
US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, and the theil income inequality index (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S 
Statistical Abstracts).  
State social policy controls are taken from Wolfers (2006) and include divorce rates, and indicators for the death penalty (number of state executions by year). 
State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the fraction of the child population that is black and 
white. 
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Table 1.5 Effect of Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws on Child Fatality Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          Child fatality rate per 100,000 children 
         
Dependent mean 1.771         
          
Mandatory arrest -0.380** -0.0508     -0.216**   
 (0.180) (0.236)     (0.0977)   
Recommended arr.   -0.183 -0.248    -0.114  
   (0.192) (0.252)    (0.112)  
Mand or Recom arr.     -0.339** -0.121   -0.196** 
     (0.144) (0.180)   (0.08) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin Neg. Bin. 
Controls for other violent 
crimes 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year economic & 
social controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend N Y N Y N Y N N N 
          
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
R-squared 0.451 0.575 0.447 0.576 0.451 0.576 - - - 
Notes: 
The dependent variable for each column is the child fatality rate per 100,000 children. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients that are 
significant at the .01, .05 .1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, *.  
Mandatory arrest states are states which require an arrest conditional on a report of domestic violence. Recommended arrest states are states where officers are 
instructed but not required to make a warrantless arrest when a domestic violence offense is reported.  
Mand or Recom arr states are states with either mandatory arrest or recommended arrest statutes. 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime 
variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  
State economic control variables include the variables: male unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and state median household income (BLS and 
US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, and the theil income inequality index (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S 
Statistical Abstracts).  
State social policy controls are taken from Wolfers (2006) and include divorce rates, and indicators for the death penalty (number of state executions by year). 
State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the fraction of the child population that is black and 
white.
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Table 1.6 Effect of Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws on the Reporting of Child Abuse 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) 
 Reporting of child abuse per 1000 persons 
     
Dependent variable mean 
 
6.93    
Mandatory arrest law effect 1.167**  0.151**  
 (0.586)  (0.0615)  
Recommended arrest law effect  -0.602  -0.116 
  (0.546)  (0.0748) 
     
Estimation method OLS OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. 
All controls Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend Y Y Y Y 
Observations 527 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.834 0.832 - - 
 
Notes:  
Each column represents a separate regression. The dependent variable for each column is the Reporting of child 
abuse rate per 1000 persons. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at 
the .01, .05 .1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, *.  
All regressions include State FE, Year FE, State economic and social policy controls, Crime controls, and a state-
specific time trend.  
All controls include: 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  
State economic control variables include the variables: male unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and 
state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, and the 
theil income inequality index (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State social policy controls are taken from Wolfers (2006) and include divorce rates, and indicators for the death 
penalty (number of state executions by year). 
State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the 
fraction of the child population that is black and white. 
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Tables 1.7 Effect of Mandatory Arrest Laws on Child Maltreatment Rates (Stratified by Age) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (8) 
Maltreatment rate/1000 
children by age 
Ages 0-3 Ages4-11 Ages12-15 Ages 0-3 Ages4-11 Ages12-15 
Dependent variable mean 15.55 12.48 11.36    
       
Mandatory arrest effect 1.710 2.549 2.288 0.0585 0.0952 0.0821 
 (1.951) (1.740) (1.590) (0.0889) (0.0851) (0.0837) 
       
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin Neg. Bin Neg. Bin 
Observations 527 527 527 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.807 0.786 0.778 - - - 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable for each column is the column title per 1000 children. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at the .01, .05 .1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, *.  
Mandatory arrest states are states which require an arrest conditional on a report of domestic violence.  
Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include state by year controls, state fixed effect, year 
fixed effect, and a state specific time trend 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  
State economic control variables include the variables: male unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and 
state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, and the 
theil income inequality index (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State social policy controls are taken from Wolfers (2006) and include divorce rates, and indicators for the death 
penalty (number of state executions by year). 
State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the 
fraction of the child population that is black and white. 
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Table 1.8 Effect of Recommended Arrest Laws on Child Maltreatment Rates (Stratified by Age) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (8) 
Maltreatment rate/1000 
children 
Ages 0-3 Ages4-11 Ages12-15 Ages 0-3 Ages4-11 Ages12-15 
Dependent variable mean 15.55 12.48 11.36    
       
Recommended arrest effect 0.194 1.083 0.966 0.0277 0.0823 0.0788 
 (1.145) (1.172) (1.087) (0.0701) (0.0837) (0.0868) 
       
       
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin 
Observations 527 527 527 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.806 0.784 0.777 - - - 
 
Coefficients that are significant at the .01, .05 .1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, *.  
 
Recommended arrest states are states where officers are instructed but not required to make a warrantless arrest 
when a domestic violence offense is reported.  
The dependent variable for each column is the column title per 1000 children. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include state by year controls, state fixed effect, year 
fixed effect, and a state specific time trend 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  
State economic control variables include the variables: male unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and 
state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, and the 
theil income inequality index (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State social policy controls are taken from Wolfers (2006) and include divorce rates, and indicators for the death 
penalty (number of state executions by year). 
State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the 
fraction of the child population that is black and white. 
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Table 1.9 Robustness Check: Effect of Mandatory Arrest, Hard No Drop Prosecution Policies, And 
Mandatory Reporting Of Child Abuse for All Persons on Child Maltreatment Rate 
 
  
 Child Maltreatment Rate per 1000 children 
  
Dependent variable mean 
 
14.154 
Mandatory arrest law 0 .1703 ** 
 (0 .076) 
Hard no-drop prosecution policy -0.0695 
 (0 .071) 
Mandatory reporting law 2.625 
 (60.057) 
  
Estimation method Negative Binomial 
All controls Y 
  
Observations 588 
R-squared - 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable for each column is the Child maltreatment rate per 1000 children. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficients that are significant at the .01, .05 .1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, *.  
Mandatory arrest states are states which require an arrest conditional on a report of domestic violence.  
Hard no drop policy: is one in which the state will push forward a prosecution using all means available.  
Mandatory reporting laws: any person who suspects child abuse or neglect is required to report. 
In addition to hard no-drop policy and mandatory reporting by all persons laws. 
Each column represents a separate regression. The regressions include all state by year controls in addition to, state 
fixed effect, year fixed effect, and a state specific time trend. 
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Table 1.10 Robustness Check: Effect of Mandatory Arrest Effect on Child Maltreatment Rate 
Using Placebo Indicator 
 (1) 
 Child maltreatment rate per1000 children 
  
Placebo Mandatory arrest effect .05617 
 (0 .0687) 
Estimation method Negative Binomial 
Other state controls Y 
  
Observations 547 
Notes: 
Placebo Mandatory arrest: A Placebo indicator which pretends that the treatment (policy) is implemented one year 
earlier. 
Each column represents a separate regression. The regressions include all state by year controls in addition to, state 
fixed effect, year fixed effect, and a state specific time trend. 
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Table 1.11 Robustness Check: Interaction Effects between Mandatory Arrest and Demographic 
Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Child maltreatment rate per 1000 children       
         
Dependent mean 
 
 14.154       
Mandatory arrest  0.16797** 0.459*** 0.3642** 0.4086** 0.2166 0.2698 0.3197 
 
 
 (0 .07547) (0.1165) (0.1526) (0.164) (0.2968) (0.5457) (0.2723) 
MandXunemp   - 0.059***      
   (0.0211)      
 
mandXunempm 
    
-0.0346 
    
    (0.0232)     
 
mandXunempf 
     
-0.05146 
   
     (0.0356)    
 
mandXcollege 
      
-.32376 
  
      (1.902)   
         
mandXHHincome       -1.70e-06  
       (9.70e-06)  
 
mandXdivorce 
        
-0.03468 
        (0.0605) 
         
Observations  588 549 549 549 549 549 549 
 
Notes:  
Each column represents a separate regression using the negative binomial estimation method. Column (1) gives the 
estimates of the baseline regression.  
The interaction terms include demographic characteristics of the perpetrator and mandatory arrest laws: 
unemployment rate (unemp), male and female unemployment rates (unempm & unempf), education (college), 
median household income (HHincome), and divorce. 
All regressions include State FE, Year FE, State economic and social policy controls, Crime controls, and a state-
specific time trend. See notes from table (1) 
All controls include: 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  
State economic control variables include the variables: male unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and 
state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, and the 
theil income inequality index (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State social policy controls are taken from Wolfers (2006) and include divorce rates, and indicators for the death 
penalty (number of state executions by year). 
State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the 
fraction of the child population that is black and white. 
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Table 1.12 Effect of Arrest Policies on Reported Child Maltreatment Rates per 1,000 children 
  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Child maltreatment rate per 1,000 children   
Dependent mean 14.154                   
            
Mandatory arr.13 1.558 3.334**         
 (0.969)  (1.566)         
Recommended arr.14   2.8043 5.0243       
   (2.855) (4.483)       
Mand/Recom arr.15     2.019* 3.961**     
     (1.089)  (1.761)     
Recom vs Disc arr.16       4.172 5.112   
       (2.98) (4.99)   
Mand vs Disc arr.17         1.206 3.431** 
         (1.080)  (1.589) 
             
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-specific  time trend N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
           
Observations 588 588 549 549 547 547 377 377 461 461 
R-squared 0.697 0.77 0.70 0.77 0.71 0.78 0.70 0.79 0.74 0.81 
 
                                                          
13 Mandatory arr.= 1 if a state implemented mandatory arrest laws, 0 otherwise (recommended or discretionary) 
14 Recommended arr. = 1 if a state implemented recommended arrest laws, 0 otherwise (mandatory or discretionary) 
15 Mand/Recom arr = 1 if a state implemented mandatory or recommended arrest law , 0 if  discretionary 
16 Recom vs Disc arr = 1 if a state implemented recommended arrest laws, 0 if discretionary 
17 Mand  vs Disc arr. = 1 if a state implemented mandatory arrest laws, 0 if discretionary 
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Table 1.13 Effect of Arrest Policies on Child Fatality Rates per 100,000 Children 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
   Child fatality rate per 100,000 children     
Dependent mean 1.771               
                  
Mandatory arr.18 -0.380** -0.0508         
 (0.18) (0.236)         
Recommended arr.19   -0.183 -0.248       
   (0.192) (0.252)       
Mand/Recom arr.20     -0.339** -0.121     
     (0.144) (0.18)     
Recom vs Disc arr.21       -0.229 -0.255   
       (0.193) (0 .262)   
Mand vs Disc arr.22          -0.392**  -0.094 
         (0.185) (0.248) 
              
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
           
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 376 376 451 451 
R-squared 0.451 0.575 0.447 0.576 0.451 0.576 0.502 0.61 0.43 0.56 
 
                                                          
18 Mandatory arr.= 1 if a state implemented mandatory arrest laws, 0 otherwise (recommended or discretionary) 
19 Recommended arr. = 1 if a state implemented recommended arrest laws, 0 otherwise (mandatory or discretionary) 
20 Mand/Recom arr = 1 if a state implemented mandatory or recommended arrest law , 0 if discretionary 
21 Recom vs Disc arr = 1 if a state implemented recommended arrest laws, 0 if discretionary 
22 Mand  vs Disc arr. = 1 if a state implemented mandatory arrest laws, 0 if discretionary 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Child Maltreatment: 
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1995-2014 
It has been argued that marijuana use is part of a post-modern consumer culture which 
crosses class, gender, race, age and geographic boundaries (Simpson, 2003). Marijuana is also 
the most widely used illicit drug in the United States. In 2014, 27 million people aged 12 or older 
used an illicit drug in the past 30 days – these estimates are driven primarily by marijuana use 
with 22.2 million Americans reporting the use of marijuana in the past 30 days (SAMHSA, 
2014). Public opinion on marijuana has shifted considerably in the last 40 years, with the 
majority of Americans (53%) now favoring legalization (PEW Research, 2015). Furthermore, a 
2014 Gallup Poll found that 76 percent of Americans favored no jail time for those convicted of 
minor marijuana possession (PEW Research, 2014).  This broader social acceptance of the drug 
has been reflected by policies being implemented at the state level that have allowed for the use 
of marijuana to be decriminalized, legalized, or approved for medicinal purposes in 23 states plus 
the District of Columbia.  
How does the legalization of medical marijuana affect child maltreatment?   
We might expect that children living with substance-abuse caregivers may experience a 
greater risk for maltreatment. In fact, the 2010 Fourth National Incidence Study found that illegal 
drug use was a factor in 9.5% of cases of physical abuse and about 12.5% of all neglect cases 
 
2.1 Introduction and Motivation 
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(Sedlak et al., 2010). Parents who have substance use problems are more likely to contribute to 
severe family dysfunction, be physically abusive, and commit child neglect than those without 
diagnosed substance abuse problems (Ammerman et al., 1999; Appleyard et al., 2011).  
Caregiver substance misuse has also been documented as a predictor of severity in child 
maltreatment cases (Sprang, Clark & Bass, 2005; Staton-Tindall, Sprang & Straussner, 2016). 
Some studies suggest that cannabis may act as a gateway drug that encourages other forms of 
illicit drug use such as cocaine and heroin or alcohol use (see Jeffery DeSimone, 1998; Hall & 
Lynskey, 2009; Wen et al., 2015). While little attention has been paid to marijuana use and 
family violence, the link between illicit drug abuse, alcohol abuse and child maltreatment has 
been well documented. For example, Famularo and colleagues (1992) find specific associations 
between alcohol use and physical maltreatment, and cocaine abuse and sexual maltreatment. 
Considering the implications of a gateway effect, marijuana use could indirectly elevate the risk 
of child maltreatment.  The gateway effect is one of the principal reasons cited in defense of laws 
prohibiting the use or possession of marijuana (Morral, McCaffrey & Paddock, 2002). Despite a 
number of scientific studies disputing this claim (see DeSimone, 1998, Tarter et al. 2016), the 
debate over the most appropriate policy has been generally polarized due to differing positions 
on the drug’s harm. 
Though clinical trials have demonstrated the benefits of cannabis in alleviating chronic 
and neuropathic pain, other scientific studies have indicated significant physical and 
psychotropic side-effects of the drug (Leung, 2011). Regular marijuana use has been linked to 
adverse health outcomes, including mental slowness, short-term memory loss, impaired reaction 
times, and accentuation of anxiety and depression (Crean, Crane & Mason, 2011; Cellucci, 
Jarchow & Hedt, 2004). Chronic use of marijuana in the long run increases the risk for a number 
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of psychosocial outcomes including diminished relationship quality, lower satisfaction with life, 
and greater need for economic assistance (Dubowitz et al., 2015; Volkow et al., 2014).  These 
effects can often lead to an unstable and chaotic environment for children, in which case basic 
needs such as nutrition, supervision and medical care may go unmet (Staton-Tindall et al., 2016). 
Similarly, parents with depression and anxiety disorders are less likely to prevent injury and 
harm to their children and more likely to exhibit stress or aggravation during parenting (Chung 
et.al., 2005).However, mental health problems cannot be causally connected to involvement in 
drug or marijuana use, even if it can be illustrated that its (ab)use may exacerbate pre-existing 
psychiatric disorders (Simpson, 2003; Crome, 1999). 
So far, studies examining the link between marijuana use and psychosocial disorders 
have not addressed the nature of the following relationship: does marijuana use lead to such 
disorders or do issues such as anxiety and depression lead to the (over-) use of marijuana? In 
fact, one qualitative study found that parents who used marijuana reported that the drug 
improved their parenting by allowing them to relax and manage difficult emotions relating to 
parenting – thereby preventing them from yelling at or hitting their children (Thurstone et al., 
2013).  It must be noted that these results are preliminary in nature and must be interpreted with 
caution as they only include data from 11 parents in five focus groups. Additionally, conflicting 
results among most of the studies seem to be a result of differences in the degree of exposure, 
individual sensitivity, and drug potency (e.g., CBD/THC ratio23) (Niesink & Laar, 2013). Thus, 
research focused on the benefits and consequences of marijuana use merits further investigation.  
                                                          
23 Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is the main psychoactive substance in cannabis. Cannabidiol (CBD) is a cannabinoid 
that appears in cannabis resin but rarely in herbal cannabis. 
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There is a growing body of empirical research examining the link between illegal drug 
consumption and intimate partner violence. However, due in part to differences in research 
design, the empirical support for this notion is rather mixed. While similar efforts exist with 
respect  to marijuana use and child abuse (see Friesthler, Gruenewald & Wolf, 2014), no single 
analysis has assessed the overall impact of medical marijuana laws (MML) on child 
maltreatment rates across the United States.  
Several studies have found that legalizing medical marijuana and decriminalizing its use 
leads to greater access and use of the drug (see Cerda et al., 2012; Anderson, Hansen & Rees, 
2015; Freisthler et al., 2013). For example, at the state level, Pacula et al. (2013) conclude that 
states which allowed medical marijuana distribution through dispensaries or home cultivation 
had higher levels of past month marijuana use than states with no such laws. Additionally, 
legalization reduces the need for judicial and correctional spending on marijuana related offenses 
and facilitates the reallocation of police resources toward other violent crimes such as domestic 
violence. Thus this paper seeks to study the link between marijuana use and violence aimed at 
children, with the main purpose of examining the role that changes in marijuana legislation may 
play in the incidence of child abuse.  
This paper begins by extending the current MML-crime literature by providing a 
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of MMLs implemented at the state level on reported 
child victimization rates. I show that specific dimensions of medical marijuana regulation 
differentially influence the magnitude of reported incidences of child abuse, a finding which 
sheds new light on the current literature. More specifically, using fixed effects analysis applied to 
data from the Child Maltreatment Reports (1995-2014) and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR), I show that states that allow for home cultivation in addition to decriminalizing its use 
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see an increase in the magnitude of reported incidences of child maltreatment rates This, of 
course, does not mean that marijuana legislation caused an increase in maltreatment rate.  As 
noted in the first chapter, two factors influence reported incidences of abuse: actual maltreatment 
and the proportion of maltreated cases that are reported. Establishing a distinction between the 
two definitions can help understand the true impact of these laws. 
There is an apparent gap between the enforcement of child safety laws and marijuana 
statutes. For example, there are no formal guidelines instructing child welfare professionals on 
how to handle cases where marijuana use has been recommended by a physician. Furthermore, 
reports of abuse and neglect that come to the attention of Child Protective Services (CPS) do not 
differentiate between specific substances used; thus very little is known about which specific 
drugs may be more likely to result in maladaptive parenting behaviors (Freisthler et al., 2015). 
Indeed, marijuana is still considered as an illicit drug by many professionals, and anecdotal 
evidence exists where CPS workers have removed children or denied custody because of the 
parents’ legal use of marijuana24. This speculation of child endangerment due to marijuana use 
can lead to an increase in the reporting of child maltreatment cases.  
To test the reporting hypothesis, I use an alternative proxy for maltreatment rates that is 
less likely to be biased by reporting: rates of child fatality from abuse and neglect. Child 
fatalities must always be reported, and using an extreme form of an incident is a common 
strategy among economists studying crime (see Iyengar, 2011; Levitt, 1998). I find that states 
that allow for home cultivation in addition to decriminalizing its use see a decrease in child 
fatality rates. This is obviously an imperfect proxy for overall maltreatment, but the fact that 
                                                          
24 Jeanette Daggett v Dustin A. Sternick (2015): Sternick  argues that  the Maine Supreme Judicial court infringed  
on  the  protections  afforded  to  him  by the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act,22 M.R.S. § 2423-E(3) (2014), 
by reaching findings related to his marijuana use and that the court abused its discretion in awarding  primary  
residence  to  Daggett  based  on  Sternick’s  lawful  marijuana  use.    
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there is a consistent decline in fatality rates in states with marijuana regulation is evidence that 
states with MML do see a reduction in actual maltreatment.  
Given that there is limited research on the relationship between marijuana consumption 
and child maltreatment, estimating the impact of various marijuana laws remains crucial. This 
paper improves on the existing literature in that it is the first to analyze the impact of drug 
regulatory variables on child victimization in a nationally representative, state-level panel dataset 
spanning 19 years.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief historical 
background of MMLs in the U.S. Section 2.3 summarizes the limited research examining the 
impact of MML on crime in general and, more specifically, family violence. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 
discuss data sources and methodology. I present the results from my analyses of the impact of 
these laws on child victimization rates in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Cannabis the Drug 
Cannabis is largely derived from the female plant of cannabis sativa, with the two main 
active ingredients being delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and Cannabidiol (CBD).THC 
accounts for both the physical and psychotropic effects of cannabis, and hence is also the most 
widely studied.  The mechanisms by which CBD exerts its effect are not precisely known, and by 
itself has almost no effect on normal physiological processes (Niesink & Laar, 2013). Not much 
is known of the safety and side effects of CBD either. Few studies have described the effects of 
CBD for therapeutic applications in clinical trials (Bergamaschi et al., 2011). While there is 
evidence from controlled trials that cannabinoids are effective in relieving nausea, alleviating 
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severe pain, and improving appetite in people with HIV and cancer-related illnesses 
(Bergamaschi et al., 2011), chronic cannabis use is also associated with psychiatric toxicity and 
long-term psychiatric conditions (Reece, 2009). However, to date, there is no conclusive 
evidence to support the relationship between chronic cannabis use and the occurrence of 
psychosis. In fact, very few studies that have been published distinguish between the types of 
cannabis used, and none have given an indication of the THC/CBD ratio (Niesink & Laar, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 A Brief History of Medical Marijuana Laws (MMLs) in the United States 
America’s connection with cannabis dates back to the early 1600s. The cultivation of 
cannabis (hemp) was the primary reason for America’s colonization; it was produced initially by 
Jamestown settlers who were ordered by King James I in 1619 to grow 100 plants specifically 
for export (Deitch, 2003). Hemp cultivation remained a prominent industry until the mid-1800s, 
and throughout this period, the plant was commonly used by physicians to treat a broad spectrum 
of ailments (Anderson, Hansen & Daniel, 2013; Pacula et al., 2002). From 1850 to 1942, 
marijuana was listed in the United States Pharmacopeia and National Formulary; the official list 
of recognized medicinal drugs (Anderson, Hansen & Daniel, 2013).  However, in 1937, the 
Marihuana Tax Act –which did not criminalize marijuana but did impose prohibitive taxes on its 
use – was passed after research indicated a link between marijuana use and crime (Deitch, 2003). 
Since then, several other laws were signed, including the Boggs Act (1952), the Narcotic Control 
Act (1956) and the Federal Controlled Substances Act (1970), which effectively discontinued the 
use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and ultimately criminalized it at the federal level (Blitz, 
1992; Deitch, 2003).  
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The Controlled Substances Act classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug with high 
potential for abuse and no currently accepted medical uses in treatment.  In 1973, Oregon 
became the first state to decriminalize cannabis – whereby possession of one ounce or less was 
treated as a misdemeanor with no jail time. By 1978, Nebraska became the eleventh state to pass 
the decriminalization legislation. During the Reagan administration, however, Congress passed 
several anti-drug legislation bills25, which effectively ended the wave of states decriminalizing 
the possession of marijuana.  
In 1996, California became the first state to legalize medical marijuana by passing the 
Compassionate Use Act (California Proposition 215). It removed criminal penalties for using, 
possessing and cultivating marijuana for medical purposes. The law provided immunity from 
criminal prosecution or sanction to physicians who recommended or prescribed marijuana to 
their patients. Despite federal restrictions, since 1996, 23 states have adopted medical marijuana 
laws, instituting their own specific restrictions for use, cultivation, possession limits, and 
allowance of dispensaries. While some states did allow doctors to prescribe marijuana before 
1996, it had no practical effect since it was against federal law for pharmacies to distribute the 
drug (Anderson, Hansen & Daniel, 2013)26. 
 
2.3 Literature Review  
2.3.1 Marijuana and Crime 
While there is so far a dearth of literature reporting on the impact of medical marijuana 
laws on child maltreatment rates, considerable research has been conducted on the broader 
                                                          
25  Federal Bail Reform Act (1984); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
26 Doctors in states where medical marijuana is legalized avoid violating federal law by recommending marijuana to 
their patients rather than prescribing the drug’s use (Anderson, Hansen & Daniel, 2013) 
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subject of the impact of marijuana on negative life outcomes, criminal proclivity, and violent 
behavior.  
As marijuana is a psychoactive substance, behavioral changes following its use are 
common and expected.  The nature of some of these behavioral changes is subject to widespread 
academic debate, particularly when hostile or violent behavior is in focus. Some studies find that 
short-term use of marijuana may actually inhibit aggressive behavior, while long-term use can 
alter the nervous system in a way that augments violent proclivities (National Research Council, 
1993). However, other studies have found socio-emotional deficits in marijuana users, including 
patterns of interpersonal withdrawal, hostility, and diminished interpersonal skills (Platt et al., 
2010; Clopton et al., 1979; Roser et al., 2012). For example, Ansell et al. (2014) found hostile 
and impulsive behaviors as well as perceptions of hostility in others to be associated with 
marijuana use among subjects with no reported substance dependence. These findings were 
supported by Theunissen et al. (2012) who found that infrequent users of marijuana experience 
stronger effects on attention and inhibition following marijuana use relative to chronic users. 
However, further research is needed to examine whether these associations are causal since 
increases in interpersonal hostility could act an acute stressor that motivates the use of marijuana. 
It is well documented that there is an association between illegal drugs and crime, but 
knowledge of this association alone may not be helpful in guiding policy designed to reduce 
violent crime (Markowitz, 2005). One might expect that marijuana use causes acceleration in 
criminal involvement; however, the empirical support for this notion is rather mixed. Bennet et 
al. (2008) conducted a systematic review of the literature and a meta-analysis of the strength of 
the relationship between types of drug used and criminal behavior. Results of the review of the 
ten studies found that marijuana users were 1.5 times more likely than non-marijuana users to 
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commit a criminal offense. However, the authors found the relationship to be weaker than hard 
drugs such as heroin, crack, and cocaine.  
To the extent that marijuana legalization may increase a broader acceptance and use of 
the drug, these policies could then help identify the potential causal relationships between 
marijuana access, use, and societal costs or benefits. Indeed, several studies have concluded that 
there is a positive association between MMLs, decriminalization, and consumption27, and these 
policies could potentially shift its availability to adolescents. For example, Thurstone, Lieberman 
and Schmiege (2011) examined the prevalence of medical marijuana use among 80 adolescents 
in a substance treatment program in Denver, Colorado. Their study found that a large portion of 
the participants (48%) reported acquiring marijuana from someone with a medical marijuana ID 
card, concluding that persons with such ID cards may provide a source of supply for teenagers. 
Researchers have also tried to make use of the variation in MMLs to tease out the causal 
relationships between state policies and crime rates. Potentially, MMLs can lead to lower rates of 
crime and violence – prospective customers would prefer legal outlets because of reduced risk of 
arrest and the state regulatory systems could then design safeguards against potential criminal 
involvement (Shepard & Blackley, 2016).  
While earlier studies may have suggested a positive link between 
decriminalization/MMLs and higher incidences of rape, robberies and assault,28 there has been 
little evidence providing a systematic involvement of criminal behavior in states that have passed 
MMLs. In fact, evidence from recent studies show that MMLs may be associated with lower 
crime rates. For example, using an ecological cross-sectional design, Kepple and Friesthler 
(2012) studied the density of medical marijuana dispensaries and property/violent crime rates in 
                                                          
27 See Chu, 2012; Cerda et al., 2012; Pacula et al., 2010; Harper et al., 2012; Freisthler et al., 2013 
28 See Salmelainen, 1995; Niveau & Dang, 2003; Pacula & Kilmer, 2003 Baker, 1998 
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Sacramento, California. Their study found no link between marijuana dispensaries and crime; 
concluding that the safety measures used by dispensaries (eg., doormen, and video cameras) may 
have had countervailing effects on criminal activity. Morris et al. (2014), generalized these 
results by using state level panel data from 1990-2006 to estimate the association between MML 
and property/crime rates. Findings from the research showed that the legislation preceded the 
decline in homicide and assault, suggesting a drop in violent crime. Morris et al. (2014) and 
Shepard & Blackley (2016) reached similar conclusions, concluding that the passage of medical 
marijuana laws did not precipitate an increase in criminal behavior, and furthermore possibly 
reduced it. 
 
2.3.2 Marijuana and Interpersonal Violence 
The majority of the studies that have examined the co-existence of substance abuse and 
interpersonal violence have focused on alcohol, without including other commonly used 
substances such as marijuana29. Of recent concern within the study of associations between 
substance use and violence is intimate partner violence, or IPV. So far research findings on the 
association between marijuana use and IPV have been inconsistent. Using data from 96 studies, 
Moore et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analytic review to quantitatively evaluate the relationship 
between specific drug use and intimate partner aggression. Their results suggest that the 
psychopharmacological effects of the drug produces increased aggression between intimate 
partners. Some studies have found that marijuana use is highly correlated with psychological 
abuse (Bennett et al. 2008), while others have linked more severe forms of IPV and IPV 
recurrence to marijuana use (Wofordt et al., 1994; Chermack et al. 2001). A major limitation of 
                                                          
29 See Heyman, O’Leary & Jouriles, 1995; Leonard &Senchak, 1996; Schumacher et al., 2008)  
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the previous studies is that most of them have been cross-sectional. It is thus important to test 
whether marijuana use is predictive of subsequent IPV (Smith et al., 2014). Reingle, et.al. (2012) 
used longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to examine 
the association between IPV and marijuana use. The authors found that consistent marijuana use, 
independent of alcohol use, was a strong predictor of intimate partner aggression for both victims 
and perpetrators.  
Contrary to the previous literature some studies have suggested that marijuana use may 
be inversely associated with IPV. For example, a nine-year longitudinal study examining a 
community sample of newly married couples found that after controlling for important covariates 
(e.g., anti-social behavior, alcohol use), frequent use of marijuana generally predicted less 
frequent partner aggression over the first nine years of marriage (Smith et al., 2014). 
Additionally, Stuart et al. (2013) found that women were less likely to perpetrate physical 
aggression on days in which they had used marijuana relative to non-use days. There are also 
some studies suggesting a weak causal link between marijuana and IPV. The analyses of Fals-
Stewart et al. (2003) indicated that the consumption of opiate-based drugs and cannabis were not 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of male-to-female partner aggression at any level of 
severity. Testa et al. (2003) reached similar conclusions; albeit being the most common drug 
used by the survey respondents. The authors reported that within ongoing relationships hard drug 
use (cocaine, heroin), but not marijuana use alone, predicted severe IPV and recurrence of IPV. 
In addition to the lack of association between marijuana use and partner aggression, the authors 
suggest that marijuana use may help suppress aggressive behavior.  
The literature regarding the effects of marijuana use on child abuse and neglect have been 
limited. Using survey data from respondents living in 50 mid-size cities in California, Freisthler 
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et al. (2015) used linear mixed effects multilevel modeling to assess the impact of marijuana use 
on abusive/neglectful parenting. They found a significant and positive association between the 
density of medical marijuana dispensaries and frequency of child physical abuse by parents. 
Their findings suggest that parents who are current users of marijuana engage in physical abuse 
more frequently, and may also have higher aggressive tendencies than their counterparts who do 
not use marijuana. However, the authors found little evidence to suggest that past year marijuana 
use related to supervisory neglect, and in fact found there was a negative relationship between 
marijuana use and physical neglect.  
In summary, the current literature provides mixed and inconclusive evidence about the 
marijuana and domestic violence nexus, and is uncertain about the effects of MMLs on child 
victimization. Since the majority of the survey studies have been correlational or cross-sectional, 
the generalizability of the results may be limited due to over-reliance on self-reported measures, 
lack of information regarding severity and nature of the offenses, and response biases (e.g. social 
desirability bias) (Moore & Stuart, 2005). Freisthler et al. (2015) note that their reliance on data 
gathered through a list-assisted telephone sample of only landlines, likely underestimates the 
abuse and neglect rates among populations with no landlines. Thus the causal mechanisms of the 
relationship between marijuana use and child maltreatment remain unknown. Furthermore, due 
to social desirability bias, some parents may not disclose if they are abusive or neglectful 
parents, and may even report their abusive practices at lower rates than would be accurate. These 
inconsistent conclusions continue to fuel the debate about the marijuana-violence relationship. 
Indeed, a better understanding of how changes in marijuana legislation may affect child 
maltreatment at the population level is needed.  
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The potential externality eﬀ ect of marijuana legalization on crime and illegal drug 
consumption has been of primary concern in the current drug policy debate. Studies have shown 
that legalizing marijuana is associated with an increase in marijuana consumption among all 
ages. Consequently, the welfare implications will depend largely on whether marijuana use itself 
generates negative or positive externalities to children, and on the extent to which marijuana 
serves as a gateway to harder illicit drugs and to substance abuse. 
A major societal concern about marijuana intoxication is the psychological and physical 
effects which may directly affect the well-being of children and other non-users of cannabis. For 
example, marijuana is known to impair motor skills, trigger psychiatric illnesses including mood 
disorder and latent schizophrenia, and cause short term memory loss and temporal distortions 
(Platt et al., 2010; Roser et al., 2012).  These effects can increase the potential risk of parental 
neglect and abuse. On the other hand, preliminary clinical research supports the potential 
medicinal value of marijuana (see Walsh, Nelson & Mahmoud, 2003).  Positive impacts on 
parenting are likely to result if parents used the drug under medical supervision to relieve chronic 
pain, anxiety, seizures, and other illnesses. Thus, depending on the degree to which these 
positive and negative effects are experienced across populations on average, marijuana 
legalization could either increase or decrease the risk of maladaptive parenting. 
There is also a possibility of an indirect link to violence. A large body of research has 
established a positive causal connection between alcohol abuse, illicit drug use (e.g. cocaine and 
heroin) and domestic violence. A 1998 study by the National Center on Addiction and Substance 
Abuse found that children whose parents abused illicit drugs and alcohol were three to four times 
2.3.3 Extension of the Literature Review 
 65 
 
more likely to be severely maltreated than children of parents who were not substance abusers 
(Reid Macchetto & Foster, 1998). 
There has also been substantial research on whether marijuana use is likely to precede the 
use of harder illicit drugs and other addictive substances such as alcohol. The findings thus far 
have varied. For instance, a longitudinal study found that among adults with no history of 
alcohol abuse, those who reported marijuana use during the first wave of the survey were more 
likely to develop an alcohol use disorder within three years relative to those who reported no 
marijuana use (Pacek, Martins & Crum, 2012). Wen et al. (2015) also found a positive 
association between MMLs and frequency of binge drinking for adults over 20 years of 
age. Additionally, a meta-analytic review by Merill et al. (1994) found that cocaine use was 17 
times more likely in adults that used marijuana as children. Other studies have also found a 
significant correlation between marijuana use and illicit drug dependence (see Fergusson, Boden 
& Horwood, 2006).While these findings appear to support the gateway hypothesis, authors 
Morral, McCaffrey & Paddock (2002) suggest that factors such as familial relations, social 
environment, and genetic predisposition to illicit drugs may be more reliable predictors of future 
drug consumption. Further, using data from the 1993-2010 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System, Anderson et al. (2013) found that MMLs may significantly reduce the probability of past 
month alcohol use and frequency of binge drinking. Clinical studies have also suggested that 
smoking marijuana may prevent the development of tolerance to opiates (see Cichewicz and 
Welch, 2003) and that MMLs are associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in prescription opioid-
related mortality (Bachhuber et al., 2014). The current debate provides little evidence to support 
or refute the suggestion that marijuana use and MMLs are causally linked to the subsequent 
abuse of alcohol and licit-illicit drugs. 
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Some studies suggest that marijuana may not only be a gateway to harder illicit drugs but 
also to crime and criminal behavior. According to the research conducted by Evans (2013), the 
probability of being arrested for a non-drug violent and income-producing crime is greater for 
marijuana users than for non-users. If so, parental marijuana use may increase child 
maltreatment. Indeed, some studies find that severe family dysfunction, such as parental 
criminality, elevates the risk of child maltreatment (Juby & Farrington, 2001). Additionally, 
Farrington (2010) suggests that poor parental supervision and parental criminality are the 
strongest predictors of juvenile delinquency and anti-social behavior. If, however, criminality is 
explained by marijuana’s illegality, rather than from the drug itself, legalization can break 
marijuana’s link to violence. Thus, depending on which pathways are the strongest, marijuana 
use and its medical availability can negatively or positively influence child welfare outcomes. 
This highlights the need for rigorous empirical research in this area. 
 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
According to the literature, MMLs should increase both the supply and demand for 
marijuana, and thus increase the consumption of marijuana unambiguously (Anderson, Hansen 
& Rees, 2013).  Since marijuana is a psychoactive substance, it may influence a perpetrators’ 
perception of the expected costs or payoffs when supplying violence. If marijuana use does 
increase a caregivers’ negligent or abusive behavior, I would expect legalization to lower the 
cost of engaging in violence. Reducing the cost of violence is expected to raise the amount of 
violence supplied; thus one possible outcome of legalization is a positive relationship between 
marijuana use and child victimization. It is also quite possible that a caregiver, under the 
influence of marijuana, may engage in certain types of maladaptive behavior, thus I separately 
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examine the relationship between MMLs and the most common types of maltreatment (neglect 
and physical abuse). 
To study the impact of medical marijuana laws and its different dimensions on child 
victimization, I employ the use of three major datasets: Child Maltreatment Reports, National 
Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN) and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR). These data sources and variables have been described previously. Table 2.2 provides 
definitions for my outcome measures. Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics.  
Data taken from the maltreatment reports and NDACAN capture the severity of child 
victimization. The data assesses overall maltreatment rates, children who were victims of neglect 
and physical abuse, victims by age, and deaths attributed to child maltreatment (fatality rates). 
Additionally, publicly available data from the UCR provide information on crime and arrest rates 
(e.g., offenses against the family, drug offenses, alcohol offenses) and help reinforce the findings 
from the previous literatures’ marijuana-crime link.  
In 2014 the CPS received 3.6 million referrals alleging child abuse and neglect, of which 
more than 50 percent of the cases were investigated. 702,000 children were victims of abuse and 
neglect (9.4 victims per 1,000 children) and an estimated 1,580 children died due to 
maltreatment (2.3 per 100,000 children).  According to the CPS there are two major risk factors 
that may increase the likelihood of victimization – caregiver alcohol abuse and caregiver drug 
abuse. While some states may have legalized marijuana, no formal guidelines exist on how 
welfare workers should handle a caregivers’ recreational or even medicinal use of the drug.  
In 2014, 27% of all child maltreatment cases were related to parental drug use (Child 
Maltreatment Report, 2014). Since marijuana is still classified as a schedule I substance, child 
welfare agents might not distinguish a parents’ use of marijuana from other illegal substances 
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such as heroin or cocaine even if it’s used for medical purposes. This could potentially increase 
the number of at-risk victims being reported to the CPS – thereby increasing the reported 
incidences of child maltreatment rates.  
I also investigate an alternative proxy for maltreatment that is less likely to be affected by 
the reporting bias: child fatality rates.  Since institutions and authorities (law enforcement, state 
vital statistics departments, medical examiners, hospitals, etc.) must report any deaths due to 
maltreatment, and because such a report will be investigated by the CPS, this variable is unlikely 
to face reporting bias. One limitation, however, is that it is an extreme outcome, and as such 
could create noise in the proxy.  
The primary independent variables of interest are states that have passed medical 
marijuana laws (MMLs). To determine when a MML was passed within each state, I used the 
research conducted by Pacula et al. (2015) and updated it with information from the official 
legislative website of each US state, NCLS30 and NORML31.  Specifically, dichotomous 
indicators are included for whether a state has the following: laws that allow for the medicinal 
use of marijuana (MML); legal protection for patients to grow their own plants for medicinal 
purposes (home cultivation laws); provisions for patients to use marijuana to mitigate chronic 
pain; and decriminalization statutes in conjunction with MMLs.  
All state laws allow patients to possess and use small quantities of marijuana without 
being subjected to state criminal penalties. However there are variations within each state’s 
MML –each have their own specific restrictions for possession limits, home cultivation and 
qualifying conditions. For example, while only two states – California and Washington – allow 
the use of marijuana to treat anorexia, the majority of states with MMLs include provisions for 
                                                          
30 NCLS – National Conference of State Legislatures  
31 NORML – National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws 
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conditions such as HIV-AIDS, cancer, cachexia, chronic pain, and other conditions approved by 
the state health department. Possession and cultivation limits can also vary from one ounce and 
six plants in Alaska to 2.5 ounces and 12 plants in Michigan (Hoffmann & Weber, 2010). 
Currently, only 15 states allow for home cultivation of medical marijuana by patients.  
Users in the states which have decriminalized possession may face a lower expected 
penalty (Markowitz, 2005) and therefore a lower price of using marijuana. California’s 
decriminalization statute (2010) provides an example of how the possession of small amounts 
(less than one ounce) of marijuana constitutes a simple misdemeanor:  
Except as authorized by law, every person who possesses not more than 28.5 grams of 
marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis, is guilty of an infraction punishable by a fine of 
not more than one hundred dollars32. 
States that have home cultivation and decriminalization laws greatly liberalize access for 
patients and recreational users. It also provides a source of easily accessible marijuana for youth 
recreational use and broadens the social approval of marijuana use (Pacula et al., 2015). If as 
some research suggests, these laws lead to an increase in marijuana consumption and to an 
increase in IPV, then one would expect that in states that have the most lenient form of the law 
(i.e. home cultivation in conjunction with decriminalization) there would be an increased risk in 
the frequency and severity of child maltreatment. Table (2.1) gives a summary of the 23 states 
that have legalized marijuana for medical use and 17 states that have decriminalized its use.  
Sociodemographic and economic characteristics may also play a role in determining a 
perpetrators’ propensity toward supplying violence. These variables and their sources have been 
described in the previous chapter.  To aid in controlling for a variety of time-varying and 
                                                          
32 California Law: BILL NUMBER: SB 1449 
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potentially confounding factors I include each state’s unemployment rate, male to female 
employment ratio, percent population living below the poverty level, college and high school 
attainment rate, median household income, population density, divorce rates, indicators of race, 
percent of the state population incarcerated, and violent crime rates. These variables serve as 
proxies for opportunities available to perpetrators. For example, higher unemployment and 
poverty rates may correspond to higher stress and depression due to fewer opportunities being 
available; parents then may be less likely to invest time and money in their children. In such 
cases basic needs can be neglected. Conversely, states with a higher proportion of educated 
people and higher income (real wages) have more well-paying employment opportunities, and 
have a higher cost of engaging in violence. As a result, a negative relationship is expected for 
education and household income. 
Additional controls include the percent of the population between the ages of 15-24 and 
25-45 (U.S. Census Statistical Abstracts); the number of police officers per 100,000 persons 
(Census Bureau, UCR); female share of officers per 100,000 persons (Census Bureau, UCR); 
arrest rates for types of offenses (UCR); and beer and alcohol consumption per capita (Beer 
Institute). These variables account for other state-level changes that could separately explain 
maltreatment rates. For example, arrest rates (enforcement) and the number of police officers 
measure the effectiveness of a state’s efforts against crime in general. They are included in all 
models to measure the risk of punishment for committing a crime. I expect that higher police 
presence and higher arrest rates for family offenses would increase the cost of violence, thereby 
reducing maltreatment. Miller & Segal (2014) found lower domestic violence escalation rates as 
a result of an increase in reporting by female police officers. I expect a similar relationship with 
respect to female share of officers and reported child maltreatment rates. Additionally, a number 
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of studies have found that alcohol is a significant contributory factor to child maltreatment, 
linking alcohol consumption to reduced self-control, mental health issues, antisocial personality 
characteristics, and thus a higher risk of physical abuse and neglect.  Finally, to allow for 
variation in MMLs, to address time shocks and control for heterogeneity I include state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects and state specific linear time trends. 
 
2.5 Empirical Strategy 
2.5.1 Methodology  
In light of the uncertainty of the effects of MMLs, this paper examines whether states that 
have implemented these laws see a change in child victimization rates. Specifically, to estimate 
these outcomes, I use the fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to exploit the 
within-state variation introduced by the passage of MMLs in 23 states plus D.C. over the 19 year 
observation period. 
One limitation of using the standard fixed effects model is that it does not account for 
cross-sectional dependence. This cross correlation of errors could be due to omitted common 
effects that may not be quantitatively measured, such as social norms or psychological behavior 
patterns (Chudik & Pesaran, 2013). In order to test whether the residuals in my fixed effects 
regression are spatially independent, I perform the Pesaran CD test, as recommended by Hoechle 
(2007). The null hypothesis of the CD test states that spatial dependence is indeed present. Since 
spatial dependence could lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates, I estimate the fixed effects 
model that is robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and very general forms of cross-
sectional and temporal dependence.  
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To carry out the fixed effects analysis I estimate equation (1) where each of the child 
offenses variable (i.e. child maltreatment rates, victims by age, fatality rates, arrest rates for 
family offenses), is the dependent variable. Formally, my empirical specification may be 
expressed as: 
𝑦𝑆𝑇 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽2  𝑋𝑆𝑇 + 𝛾𝑇 + 𝜃𝑆 + 𝛿𝑆𝑇 + 𝜖𝑆𝑇      (1) 
where for each state S, in year T, 𝑦𝑆𝑇 is the child offense rate outcome variable; the main 
explanatory variable 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑆𝑇 is a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if a state implemented a 
medical marijuana provision from year T forward, and 0 otherwise; 𝛾𝑇  and 𝜃𝑆 are year and state 
fixed effects; 𝛿𝑆𝑇 is the state-specific time trend; and 𝑋𝑆𝑇 is a vector of control variables that 
include sociodemographic, economic, crime and public policy indicators. The coefficient of 
interest is 𝛽1  which measures the effect of the MML on child victimization rate.  
Using the same specification as (1) I estimate four separate regressions where the 
regressors of interest are states that have implemented home cultivation laws; provisions for 
pain; and decriminalization laws in conjunction with MMLs and home cultivation laws (HCL). 
HCL is an indicator set to 1 if the state provides legal protection for patients or caregivers to 
grow marijuana for medicinal purposes, 0 otherwise. Decrim&HCL is a dichotomous indicator 
equal to 1 if a state has implemented both home cultivation laws and decriminalization laws at 
year T, 0 otherwise. Finally, MMLXDecrim is an indicator equal to 1 if a state has implemented 
both MMLs and decriminalization laws at time T. As implied earlier, a state’s implementation of 
MMLs is likely to either increase or decrease the likelihood of child victimization rates, thus the 
impact of MMLs on child abuse is tested in each model.  
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2.6 Estimation Results 
2.6.1 Main Results 
Deterrence theory asserts that reducing the perceived severity of legal sanctions 
associated with marijuana use will increase the demand for marijuana. However, the changes in 
legislation (i.e. an increase in demand) could result in significant and negative spillover effects to 
parents and their children, increasing the risk of child abuse and neglect.  
Table 2.4 presents the impact of MMLs on reported maltreatment rates while controlling 
for other time-varying explanatory variables. Each column reports the estimated effect of state-
level marijuana legalization from a unique regression.  In the first column, I present a 
parsimonious specification that only includes state and year fixed effects. I find that the 
legalization of medical marijuana is associated with a 13.2% increase in reported child 
maltreatment rates. Adding state level controls in column (2) reduces the magnitude of the 
estimated relationship and the significance falls from the 1% to 5% level; more importantly, 
legalization is associated with a 11.4% increase in the reported incidences of child maltreatment.  
I now extend the specification to include state-specific linear time trends to control for 
the influence of unobserved factors at the state level that trend smoothly over time (e.g., citizen 
and government sentiment toward marijuana use). Again, I find a statistically significant and 
positive effect of MMLs on child maltreatment rates. Specifically, the estimates suggest that 
after the passage of MMLs, states see an increase in reported incidences of child maltreatment by 
1.30 per 1,000 children; this translates to a 9.8% increase in reported maltreatment rates.  
Table 2.5 presents the estimates between MMLs and child maltreatment rates by age 
group. I expect victimization rates to be higher for younger children since they are more 
vulnerable to abuse and neglect than older children. Additionally, since marijuana is classified as 
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a schedule I substance at the federal level, it is more likely for parents to get reported and be 
investigated for abuse and neglect if they use marijuana in the presence of younger children. I 
find the estimates of reported incidences of abuse for younger children (ages of 0 and 3 years) to 
be much larger in magnitude and are statistically significant compared to incidences of abuse for 
older children. More specifically, for younger children between the ages of 0 to 3 (Table 2.5, 
column 1), enforcement of MML is associated with a 16.5% increase in reported maltreatment, 
and for children between ages 12 to 15 (column 4), a (statistically insignificant) 13.73% increase 
in reported incidences of maltreatment.    
Why does the implementation of MMLs increase child maltreatment? 
If MMLs are associated with an overall increase in the incidence of reported 
maltreatment rates, what could explain such an effect? There are two likely mechanisms through 
which MML – legislation that aids patients with chronic health conditions – might affect child 
maltreatment estimates.  First, MMLs caused an increase in actual maltreatment. Second, it may 
have increased the reporting rate of maltreatment. I employ two measures of child maltreatment 
to attempt to distinguish between the mechanisms and correct for any potential reporting bias: 
child fatality rates and arrest rates for family offenses. 
First, I test whether reporting and arrest patterns for family offenses changed around the 
implementation of the policy. Arrest data are frequently used in the crime literature as a measure 
of crime and to account for changes in police reporting behavior. In column (2) of Table 2.6, I 
present estimates of the impact of MMLs on arrest rates for offenses against the family, 
including all the controls mentioned above. I find that states that adopt MMLs witness a 
(statistically insignificant) 6.1% increase in arrest rates for family violence relative to states with 
no such policies. However, as Dalbo & Aizer (2014) suggest, the estimated effect of arrest may 
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not just reflect changes in reporting but also changes in arrests conditional on reporting. For 
example, police officers are more likely to arrest parents that use marijuana if the Department of 
Children and Family Services and courts consistently rule that parental usage of medical 
marijuana places the child at a substantial risk of harm. Indeed, until 2010, public opinion about 
legalizing marijuana rarely shifted, with a majority believing the drug should be made illegal and 
usage of the drug should be policed (PEW Research, 2014). 
Next, I present regression estimates of the impact of MMLs on actual maltreatment. 
Albeit a noisy proxy for maltreatment due to its low-frequency, child fatality rates can serve as 
an appropriate proxy to measure an increase or decrease in actual maltreatment following the 
implementation of state-level MMLs. The underlying premise of this approach is that child 
fatalities will always be reported to the police and CPS, and as such it will be immune from any 
reporting effect (Levitt, 1998).  
The main results are shown in Table 2.7, column (3). Baseline estimates in column (1) 
show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between MMLs and 
changes in fatality rates. However, these estimates become smaller and insignificant after 
controlling for socio-demographic factors and state-specific linear time trends (column 3). I find 
that MMLs have a negative (-0.174) impact on child fatality rates; more specifically, the results 
suggest that after the passage of the laws, states see a 9.45% reduction in child deaths due to 
maltreatment. The lack of significance could be explained, in some part, due to noise in the child 
fatality measure. While this finding does not provide evidence of a strong correlation between 
MMLs and fatality, it does not necessarily negate the possibility that an economically significant 
relationship exist.  More importantly, the evidence suggests that there may indeed be a reporting 
effect going on, and not an increase in actual maltreatment. 
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Tables 2.8 and 2.9 (column 2) provide additional evidence that MMLs may be associated 
with an increase in the reporting of child maltreatment. Interestingly, the results show that there 
is no significant positive relationship between the adoption of MMLs and rates for physical 
abuse and neglect. Moreover, the estimates indicate there may be evidence of a drop in physical 
abuse in states with medical marijuana policies. Specifically, I find that states with MMLs are 
estimated to have 0.548 fewer children who are physically abused per thousand children relative 
to states without MMLs, a reduction of 21.4 % when assessed against the sample mean. On the 
other hand, I find a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between MMLs and 
neglect, showing a 10.7% increase in the reported incidences of neglect. The pattern of results so 
far is consistent with the reporting hypothesis: parents who use medical marijuana are more 
likely to be subject to a child neglect inquiry since social workers may determine that marijuana 
use would substantially impair a parent’s judgement and ability to care for their children’s basic 
needs.  
Figure 2.2 presents graphical evidence of the effect of MMLs on reported maltreatment 
rates over time. The graph shows the means of yearly maltreatment rates before and after the 
implementation date of MMLs, with 1 on the X-axis denoting the first full year of the law being 
in effect. Prior to the implementation of MMLs, the maltreatment rates seem to be relatively 
stable; however, after the first full year of the law being in effect, there is a sharp increase in the 
reported incidences of maltreatment. After the fourth year, the treatment effect appears to be 
decreasing over time, suggesting an initial reporting effect.  
In summary, the estimates from the NCANDs and UCR data indicate a 10–13% increase 
in reported child maltreatment rates after medical marijuana legalization. However, this positive 
effect largely comes from the increase in the reporting and investigation of cases of child neglect. 
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More importantly, evidence from the child fatality estimates show that the actual incidence of 
child maltreatment may be falling in states with  MMLs.  
 
2.6.2 Robustness Checks 
Table 2.10 column (1) shows the estimates for pre-and post-legalization trends in child 
maltreatment rates. I add controls for four years of MML policy leads and three years of policy 
lags. In the years preceding the law, I find that reported maltreatment rates are negative and 
stable, but statistically insignificant; suggesting no policy endogeneity, thus lending credibility to 
the main estimates in Table 2.4. However, after the first full year of the law being in effect, 
MMLs are associated with a significant increase in reported maltreatment rates. The estimates 
for the reported maltreatment rates become even larger in magnitude, but are statistically 
insignificant, during the third year of post-legislation. However, after five or more years, while 
the estimates become negative, they continue to be statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
It is somewhat surprising that the effect of MMLs does not grow over time; nevertheless 
this pattern of results is consistent with Figure 2.2, showing the reported incidences of 
maltreatment ramping up immediately after the legislation, and slowing down in the years after. 
One potential reason for this could be due to the nature of the data – since NCANDs aggregates 
the reports into a single yearly estimate, monthly growth over time may be missed. Additionally, 
this phenomenon is consistent with the reporting hypothesis; the behavioral response seems to 
follow immediately after the passage of the law. If, as anecdotal evidence suggests that opinions 
change, whereby there is a greater social acceptance of marijuana by law enforcement and social 
workers, especially for parents who use the drug for medicinal purposes, then I would not expect 
to see growth over time. 
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Next, Table 2.4, Column (4) estimates the sensitivity of my results to an alternate 
specification. Since maltreatment is intrinsically a count of victims within a discrete time period, 
I use the negative binomial model as a specification check for my primary analyses. Table 2.4 
presents coefficients on the maltreatment rate variable from the OLS fixed effects and negative 
binomial speciﬁcations for completeness. The estimates conﬁrm the results from my main 
estimation – states with MMLs see a significant increase in the reported incidences of child 
maltreatment, and a significant decline in fatality rates (Table 2.4, column 4). In addition, when I 
use the coding preferred by Pacula et al. (2015) to obtain the effective dates of the laws, I find a 
similar pattern of statistically significant results (Tables 2.15 & 2.16). 
I now examine the impact of specific policy dimensions to capture the reporting effect 
and the true maltreatment effect: that is, provisions that allow for home cultivation and 
prescriptions for chronic pain. Since both provisions instrument for regulatory laxness, they are 
more likely to increase social availability and access to the drug. As such, these provisions are 
predicted to affect reporting behavior and consequently reported maltreatment rates through the 
changing perceived risk associated with the enforcement of parental marijuana use. I thus, expect 
parents and caregivers who grow marijuana, even if licensed, to be reported and investigated for 
(risk of) child endangerment.  
Column (2) from Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show the estimates of home cultivation laws 
(HCLs) on child maltreatment and fatality rates. Overall, I find a positive and statistically 
significant legislative effect on reported child maltreatment rates. Specifically, the results suggest 
that states with HCLs are responsible for an additional 3.26 children being reported as maltreated 
per 1000 children, translating to a 24.6% increase in reported maltreatment rates. Note that these 
estimates are twice as large as the ones from MMLs. More importantly, when I estimate the 
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effect of HCLs on child fatality rates in Table 2.12, I find the magnitude of the coefficients to be 
large and statistically significant, suggesting a 27% reduction in actual maltreatment rates. I find 
similar and statistically significant results (Column 3, Tables 2.11 & 2.12) when I test the impact 
of the provisions that allow the use of marijuana for chronic pain. Specifically, the 
implementation of provisions that allow for chronic pain is associated with a 14% increase in 
reported maltreatment rates, and a substantial 22.4% reduction in fatality rates.  
I continue to explore the differential effects of state-specific medical marijuana 
regulations by interacting MMLs with states that have decriminalized the possession of 
marijuana. Tables 2.13 and 2.14 provide further evidence that the magnitudes of the interaction 
terms are much larger in states that impose relatively lax restrictions than those with no such 
policies. These findings are consistent with my previous estimates from Tables 2.11 and 2.12, 
and build on the work by Pacula et al. (2015) who recognized the heterogeneity in the 
implementation of state level marijuana regulations. Thus, the binary MML measure in Table 2.4 
misses the heterogeneous effects and dynamics of these policies. Finally, these findings are 
consistent with the interpretation that MMLs not only influence the reported incidences of 
maltreatment, but they may also reduce the actual incidences of child maltreatment. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
Recent research by Friestler and colleagues (2015) suggests that parental marijuana use is 
related to higher incidences of physical abuse and neglect. However, to my knowledge, no 
research has examined the relationship between state marijuana legislation and child 
victimization rates. The central findings gleaned from this paper provide indirect evidence that 
marijuana use, induced by increased access to medical marijuana, affects the reported incidences 
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of child maltreatment positively. Specifically, estimates from the fixed effects regression suggest 
that after the passage of MMLs, states see a statistically significant (9.8%) increase in reported 
maltreatment rates. Using Driskoll-Kraay standard errors, these results are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and very general forms of cross-sectional dependence.  
The findings from my main model raise an important follow-up question: does medical 
marijuana legalization increase child maltreatment or child maltreatment reporting? I examine 
one particular outcome of interest to proxy for the true incidence of maltreatment: child fatality 
rates. I find a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between MMLs and child 
fatality rates. However, as discussed by Pacula et al. (2015), MMLs vary greatly and can thus 
generate heterogeneous effects. Indeed, I find the largest estimates when I look at specific 
dimensions of MMLs, where the coefficients capture not only the reporting effect but also the 
true effect on maltreatment. For example, states with provisions that allow for home cultivation 
see a 24.6% increase in the reported incidences of maltreatment and, surprisingly, a statistically 
significant 27.6% reduction in the actual maltreatment rate. Further, these findings run contrary 
to the arguments suggesting a positive relationship between the legalization of medical marijuana 
and violence.  
Data limitations do not allow me to explore all of the other channels through which 
MMLs may affect child outcomes – particularly pharmacological effects of the drug. However, 
identifying one specific mechanism through which MMLs may affect maltreatment, such as 
child fatality, does provide one piece of the puzzle. It is important to note that the negative 
relationship between MMLs and child fatality rates does not necessarily imply a strict causal 
connection that marijuana use reduces actual maltreatment. For instance, it is possible that 
marijuana regulation reduces child fatality rates through its positive reporting effect. Even if 
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growing or consuming marijuana is legal, anecdotal evidence suggests that parental use of 
marijuana can be controversial. However, with the passage of time, I expect attitudes and 
behaviors toward parental medical marijuana use to be more tolerant and accepted. As such, it is 
unlikely that reported maltreatment rates will continue to increase. Indeed, trend analyses 
provide further evidence that child maltreatment may be decreasing over time. Clearly, 
distinguishing between child maltreatment and reporting is a subject that warrants further 
attention. In sum, as the narrative of medical and recreational marijuana legislation unfolds 
across the country, more substantive research is needed to determine how marijuana use impacts 
child outcomes and parenting. 
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Figure 2.1 Past-Month Use of Selected Illicit Drugs 
Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse (2013) 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in Child Maltreatment Rates, by State MMLs 
Notes and Sources: Data is from the Child Maltreatment Reports and the National Data Archive for Child Abuse and 
Neglect (NDACAN), which provides prevalence of child maltreatment from 1995-2014. The Dashed line marks the 
timing of the medical marijuana law. As of 2014, 23 states plus D.C. have implemented MMLs; the law provides 
protection from criminal penalties for using marijuana for a medical purposes. 
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Notes and Sources: Own data collection. Referred from the following sources: Procon.org; NORML; Pacula et al. 2013 
  
State Year Passed Effective date  Pain Home Cultivation Marijuana Decriminalized Possession Limit
Alaska 1998 1999 Yes Yes 1975 1 oz/6 plants (3 mature, 3 immature)
Arizona 2010 2011 Yes Yes 2011 2.5 oz/12 plants
California 1996 1996 Yes Yes 1976 8 oz/ 6 mature or 12 immature
Colorado 2000 2001 Yes Yes 2011 2 oz/ 6 plants (3 mature, 3 immature)
Connecticut 2012 2012 Not specified 
District of Columbia 2010 2010 2014 2 oz/Not specified
Delaware 2011 2011 Yes 6 oz
Hawaii 2000 2000 Yes Yes 3 oz/ 7 plants (3 mature, 4 immature)
Illinois 2013 2014 2.5 oz
Maine 1999 1999 Yes Yes 1976 2.5 oz/6 plants
Maryland 2014 2014 Yes 2011 Not specified 
Massachusetts 2012 2013 Yes 2009 Not specified 
Michigan 2008 2008 Yes Yes 2.5 oz/ 12 plants
Minnesotta 2014 2014 1976 Not specified 
Montana 2004 2004 Yes Yes 1 oz/ 4 plants (mature)
Nebraska 1977
Nevada 2001 2001 Yes Yes 2002 1 oz/ 7 plants (3 mature, 4 immature)
New Hampshire 2013 2013 2 oz
New Jersey 2009 2010 Yes 2 oz/ Not specified
New Mexico 2007 2007 Yes 6 oz/ 16 plants (4 mature, 12 immature)
New York 2014 2014 1977 Not specified 
North Carolina 1977
Ohio 1976
Oregon 1998 1998 Yes Yes 1973 24 oz/24 plants (6 mature, 18 immature)
Rhode Island 2006 2006 Yes Yes 2013 2.5 oz/  12 plants
Vermont 2004 2004 Yes Yes 2 oz/ 9 plants (2 mature, 7 immature)
Washington 1998 1998 Yes Yes 2012 24 oz/15 plants
Provisions
Table 2.1 MML Legislation Policies by State, 1996-2014 
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Table 2.2 Summary of Data Sources 
Variables Definitions Sources and years 
Dependent Variables   
Child maltreatment 
 
Children who have experienced or 
who were at risk of experiencing 
abuse or neglect. 
NDACAN (1995-1999) 
Children’s Bureau (2000-
2014) 
 
 
 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(1995-2014) 
Child fatality rate 
 
Children who have died due to abuse 
or neglect 
Offenses against the family arrest rate Family violence includes all types of 
violent crime committed by an 
offender who is related to the victim 
either biologically or legally through 
marriage or adoption. 
Explanatory variables of Interest  
Medical Marijuana Laws 
 
Decriminalization Laws 
 
States that allow for the medical use 
of marijuana. 
Reduces penalties associated with the 
use or possession of small amounts of 
marijuana 
NORML; State statutes; 
Pacula et al. (2013); 
ProCon.org 
Family and State Environment   
Female labor force participation rate 
Unemployment rate 
Median Household income 
Poverty rate 
Population density per square mile (Proxy 
for urban rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Total population/ Land area) 
U.S. Census Bureau - 
Statistical Abstracts Series, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1995-2014) 
  
Divorce rate 
 
Beer & Alcohol consumption per capita 
 Wolfers, Justin. 2006. 
(1995 – 2000) 
CDC divorce rates (2000-
2014) 
Beer Institute (1195-2014) 
Fraction of child population that is white 
Fraction of child population that is black 
Percent of the population between ages 
15-24 
Percent of the population between ages 
25-44 
 U.S Census Bureau -
Current Population 
Surveys (1995-2014) 
College attainment rate 
High school attainment rate 
Human Capital Index Measures Frank, Mark. W. (2009) 
(1995-2014)  
State Judicial Environment   
Law enforcement 
Female Officers 
Law enforcement to population ratio 
Female officers to population ratio 
Bureau of Justice Statistics 
U.S. Census Bureau - 
Statistical Abstracts Series 
(1995-2014) 
Incarceration rates 
Drug abuse arrest rates 
Prisoner to population ratio 
Crime rate Crime to population ratio FBI Uniform Crime Report 
(1995-2014) 
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Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
           
Dependent Variables:      
Child Maltreatment Rate per 1,000 children 964 13.2315 8.42456 0.70364 82.627 
Child Fatality Rate per 100,000 children 957 1.84094 1.26986 0 16.775 
Maltreatment by age: 0-3 957 15.0515 8.7571 0.67 113.901 
Maltreatment by age: 4-7 957 12.4261 6.65694 1 103.869 
Maltreatment by age: 8-11 957 10.1774 6.65694 1.05 88.9389 
Maltreatment by age: 12-15 957 9.98481 6.69793 1.16913 88.9389 
Physical Maltreatment Rate per 1,000 children 966 2.56123 2.33376 0 21.7933 
Neglect Rate per 1,000 children 967 6.94018 5.44813 0 48.3264 
Arrest Rates for Offenses Against the Family, 
per 100,000 persons 956 39.094 35.4792 0.02083 230.472 
Independent Variables:           
Percent of the population: 15-24 1020 14.239 1.13257 10.8858 20.2158 
Percent of the population: 25-44 1020 28.0525 2.54601 22.882 36.8265 
Beer consumption per Capita 1020 1.24542 0.20897 0.67 1.91 
Alcohol Consumption per Capita 1020 2.3604 0.52117 1.2 4.7 
Arrest Rates for Drug Abuse per 100,000 
persons 986 390.072 177.734 4.5833 1105.24 
Law Enforcement to Population Ratio 1018 0.00312 0.00096 0.00024 0.00933 
Female Officers to Population Ratio 1018 0.00024 0.00022 1.6E-05 0.00177 
Violent Crime to Population Ratio 1020 0.00438 0.00255 0.00067 0.02661 
Prisoners to Population Ratio 1005 0.00413 0.00183 0.00085 0.01768 
Poverty Rate 1020 13.1104 3.72273 4.5 26.4 
Percent Black 985 13.8662 13.9825 0.44814 91.2646 
Percent White 985 66.1245 20.1882 12.38 102.324 
Population Density per sq. mile 1020 369.5 1319.51 1.06 10801.5 
Labor force Participation Rate for Females 969 60.4909 4.44932 46.3 71.2 
High School attainment Rate 1020 0.57703 0.05557 0.44878 0.74347 
College Attainment Rate 1020 0.17783 0.045 0.08398 0.45932 
Median Household Income 1020 53895.1 8260.62 35521 77506 
Divorce Rate 919 3.98627 1.07179 1.5 10.4406 
Unemployment Rate 1020 5.62978 1.96417 2.3 13.8 
 
  
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Child Maltreatment Rate per 1,000 Children 
     
Dependent variable mean 13.23146    
     
MML = 1 1.758*** 1.505** 1.303* 0.104* 
 (0.597) (0.700) (0.649) (0.0583) 
     
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin 
All Controls N Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend N N Y Y 
Observations 964 759 759 759 
Within R-squared .20 .25 .52 - 
Number of groups 51 49 49 - 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Notes: The dependent variable for each column is the child maltreatment rate per1000 children. MML=1 if 
a state implemented a medical marijuana provision. This table provides the coefficient estimates from the 
regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are based on 
Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors.  
All controls include: 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape. 
Other crime controls include, family and drug abuse arrest rates per 100,000 persons; law enforcement to 
population ratio; female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population ratio 
State economic control variables include the variables: unemployment rate, female labor force 
participation rate, and state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high 
school attainment rate, (Frank, 2009) 
State socio- demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and the U.S 
Statistical Abstracts. They include variables for the percent of the child population that is black and white; 
divorce rates, percent of the population that’s between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption 
per capita; beer consumption per capita; population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.4 Effects of MMLs on Child Maltreatment Rates 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Child maltreatment rate per 1,000 
children, by age groups 
0-3 4-7 8-11 12-15 
     
Dependent variable mean 
 
15.0515 12.426 10.177 9.985 
MML = 1 2.448* 1.441 1.222 1.371 
 (1.395) (1.200) (0.965) (0.973) 
     
All Controls Y Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend Y Y Y Y 
Observations 742 742 742 742 
Within R-squared .422 .5062 .5146 .5408 
Number of groups 48 48 48 48 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Notes: The dependent variable for each column is the child maltreatment rate per1000 children, by age cohort. 
MML=1 if a state implemented a medical marijuana provision. This table provides the coefficient estimates from the 
regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are based on Driscoll-
Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors.  
All controls include: 
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape. Other crime controls 
include, family offenses and drug abuse arrest rates per 100,000 persons; law enforcement to population ratio; 
female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population ratio 
State economic control variables include the variables: unemployment rate, female labor force participation rate, 
and state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school attainment rate, 
(Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State socio- demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and the U.S Statistical 
Abstracts. They include variables for the percent of the child population that is black and white; divorce rates, 
percent of the population that’s between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption per capita; beer 
consumption per capita; population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.5 Effects of MMLs on Child Maltreatment Rates, by Age Cohort 
 89 
 
 (1) (2) 
Arrest rates for family offenses per 100,000 persons 
   
Dependent variable mean 
 
39.09395  
MML=1 0.493 2.397 
 (2.246) (2.391) 
   
All Controls Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y 
State-specific time trend N Y 
Observations 
Within R-squared 
784 
.165 
784 
.6396 
Number of groups 49 49 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for each column is the arrest rates for offenses against a family member, 
per 100,000 persons. MML=1 if a state implemented a medical marijuana provision. This table provides 
the coefficient estimates from the regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are based on Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard 
errors.  
All regressions include state economic, socio-demographic policy and crime controls.  
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape. 
Other crime controls include, drug abuse arrest rates per 100,000 persons; law enforcement to population 
ratio; female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population ratio 
State economic control variables include the variables: unemployment rate, female labor force 
participation rate, and state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and 
high school attainment rate, (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State socio- demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and the U.S 
Statistical Abstracts. They include variables for the percent of the child population that is black and 
white; divorce rates, percent of the population that’s between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol 
consumption per capita; beer consumption per capita; population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.6 The Effect of MMLs on Arrest Rates for Family Offenses 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Child fatality rate per 100,000 children 
     
Dependent variable mean 
 
1.841    
MML = 1 -0.298* -0.093 -0.174 -.1396 
 (0.159) (0.233) (0.258) (0.105) 
     
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Neg. Bin 
All Controls N Y Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
State-specific time trend N N Y Y 
Observations 957 794 794 794 
within R-squared .025 .147 .363 - 
Number of groups 51 49 49 - 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for each column is the child fatality rate, per 100,000 children. MML=1 if a 
state implemented a medical marijuana provision. This table provides the coefficient estimates from the 
regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are based on 
Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors.  
All regressions include state economic, socio-demographic policy and crime controls.  
Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of violent crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, robbery, assault, and rape. 
Other crime controls include, law enforcement to population ratio; female officers to population ratio; 
prisoner to population ratio 
State economic control variables include the variables: unemployment rate, female labor force participation 
rate, and state median household income (BLS and US Statistical Abstracts), college and high school 
attainment rate, (Frank, 2009), population density per square mile (U.S Statistical Abstracts).  
State socio- demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and the U.S 
Statistical Abstracts. They include variables for the percent of the child population that is black and white; 
divorce rates, percent of the population that’s between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption per 
capita; beer consumption per capita; population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.7 The Effect of MMLs on Child Fatality Rates 
 91 
 
 (1) (2) 
Physical abuse rate per 1,000 children 
   
Dependent variable mean 
 
2.561  
MML=1 -0.229 -0.548 
 
 
(0.309) (0.532) 
All Controls Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y 
State-specific time trend N Y 
Observations 761 761 
within R-squared .474 .581 
Number of groups 49 49 
 
 (1) (2) 
Child neglect rate per 1,000 children 
   
Dependent variable mean 
 
6.94  
MML =1 0.340 0.746 
 (0.550) (0.647) 
   
All Controls Y Y 
State fixed effects Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y 
State-specific time trend N Y 
Observations 762 762 
within R-squared .232 .482 
Number of groups 49 49 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are child physical abuse and neglect rate, per 1,000 children. MML=1 if a state 
implemented a medical marijuana provision. This table provides the coefficient estimates from the regression model 
in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are based on Driscoll-Kraay spatial-
autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors. Crime rate controls include the number of violent crimes per 
100,000 inhabitants; family and drug abuse arrest rates per 100,000 persons; law enforcement to population ratio; 
female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population ratio. State economic control variables include 
unemployment rate, female labor force participation rate, and state median household income, college and high 
school attainment rate, population density per square mile. State socio- demographic controls include the percent 
of the child population that is black and white; divorce rates, percent of the population between the ages of 15-24 
and 25-44; alcohol consumption per capita; beer consumption per capita; population density per sq. mile. 
Table 2.8 The Effect of MMLs on Maltreatment Types: Physical Abuse  
Table 2.9 The Effect of MMLs on Maltreatment Types: Neglect 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All ages 0-3 4-7 8-11 12-15 
      
3 Years Prior -0.150 -0.893 -0.662 -0.905 -0.818 
 (0.981) (0.838) (0.812) (0.851) (0.861) 
2 Years Prior -0.322 -0.404 -0.156 -0.213 -0.140 
 (0.775) (1.221) (0.953) (0.790) (0.790) 
1 Year Prior -0.363 0.884 1.013 0.266 0.359 
 (0.994) (1.330) (1.148) (0.856) (0.802) 
Year Effective 0.461 1.086 0.809 0.358 0.518 
 (0.684) (1.109) (0.910) (0.765) (0.731) 
1 Year After -0.00656 1.272 0.595 0.249 0.444 
 (0.629) (1.266) (0.996) (0.727) (0.710) 
2 Years After 1.170 2.635* 1.827 1.068 1.304 
 (1.042) (1.503) (1.422) (1.189) (1.142) 
3 Years After 3.102 6.360 5.070 3.924 4.290 
 (2.798) (4.930) (4.406) (3.680) (3.622) 
4 Years After 0.973 4.354* 2.629 1.888 2.119 
 (1.339) (2.279) (2.068) (1.675) (1.693) 
5+ Years After -1.351 2.664 1.188 0.603 0.721 
 (1.508) (2.440) (2.227) (1.807) (1.738) 
      
Observations 759 742 742 742 742 
Number of groups 49 48 48 48 48 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for each column is the arrest rates for offenses against a family member, per 
100,000 persons. MML=1 if a state implemented a medical marijuana provision. This table provides the 
coefficient estimates from the regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are based on Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors. All 
regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state specific linear time trends. Crime rate controls 
include the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants; family and drug abuse arrest rates per 100,000 
persons; law enforcement to population ratio; female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population ratio. 
State economic control variables include unemployment rate, female labor force participation rate, and state 
median household income, college and high school attainment rate, population density per square mile. State 
socio- demographic controls include the percent of the child population that is black and white; divorce rates, 
percent of the population between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption per capita; beer 
consumption per capita; population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.10 Robustness of Estimates: The Effect of MMLs on Child Maltreatment Rates to 
Control for Policy Leads and Lags 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 Child maltreatment rate per 1,000 children 
    
Dependent variable mean 
 
13.231   
MML=1 1.303*   
 (0.649)   
HCL = 1  3.260**  
  (1.432)  
MML-Pain = 1   1.854** 
   (0.839) 
Observations 759 759 759 
Within R-squared .52 .526 .521 
Number of groups 49 49 49 
 
Table 2.12 Heterogeneity in MMLs (HCL and MML-Pain): Child Fatalities 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are child maltreatment rate per 1,000 children and child fatality rates per 100,000 
children. MML=1 if a state implemented a medical marijuana provision. HCL =1 if a state allows for caregivers to 
grow marijuana for medicinal purposes. MML-Pain =1 if a state has provisions that allow marijuana to be used for 
chronic pain.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Child fatality rate per 100,000 children 
    
Dependent variable mean 
 
  1.841   
MML =1 -0.174   
 (0.258)   
HCL = 1  -0.508*  
  (0.293)  
MML-Pain =1   -0.412* 
   (0.227) 
Observations 794 794 794 
Within R-squared .363 .367 .365 
Number of groups 49 49 49 
Table 2.11 Heterogeneity in MMLs (HCL and MML-Pain): Child Maltreatment  
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Table 2.13 Heterogeneity in MMLs: Child Maltreatment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Child maltreatment rate per 1,000 children 
 
Dependent variable mean 13.231   
    
MML =1 1.303*   
 (0.649)   
MML&Decrim =1   3.788**  
  (1.779)  
Decrim&HCL = 1   4.308** 
   (2.000) 
 
Observations 759 759 759 
Within R-squared .52 .527 .528 
Number of groups 49 49 49 
 
Table 2.14 Heterogeneity in MMLs: Child Fatalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are child maltreatment rate per 1,000 children and child fatality rate per 100,000 
children. MML=1 if a state has a medical marijuana provision. MML&Decrim =1 if a state has both MML and 
decriminalization laws. Decrim&HCL =1 if a state has both home cultivation and decriminalization laws.  
All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state specific linear time trends. Crime rate controls 
include the violent crime to population ratio; family and drug abuse arrest rates per 100,000 persons; law 
enforcement to population ratio; female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population ratio. State economic 
control variables include unemployment rate, female labor force participation rate, and state median household 
income, college and high school attainment rate, population density per square mile. State socio- demographic 
controls include the percent of the child population that is black and white; divorce rates, percent of the population 
between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption per capita; beer consumption per capita; population 
density per sq. mile. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are based on Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and 
cluster-robust standard errors.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Child fatality rate per 100,000 children 
 
Dependent variable mean 1.841   
    
MML =1 -0.174   
 (0.258)   
MML&Decrim =1   -0.214  
  (0.429)  
Decrim&HCL = 1   -0.323 
   (0.487) 
Observations 794 794 794 
Within R-squared .363 .363 .363 
Number of groups 49 49 49 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Child maltreatment rates 
per 1,000 children 
 
All ages 0-3 4-7 8-11 12-15 
Dependent variable mean 13.231 15.0515 12.426 10.177 9.985 
      
MMLeffective=1 1.429** 3.021** 1.948* 1.630* 1.801* 
 (0.606) (1.234) (1.081) (0.908) (0.897) 
      
Observations 759 742 742 742 742 
Number of groups 49 48 48 48 48 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are child maltreatment rates, per 1,000 children and maltreatment by age groups. 
MMLeffective=1 if a state’s medical marijuana provision became effective that year. This table provides the 
coefficient estimates from the regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are based on Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors. 
 All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trends Crime rate 
controls include the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants; family and drug abuse arrest rates per 
100,000 persons; law enforcement to population ratio; female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population 
ratio. State economic control variables include unemployment rate, female labor force participation rate, and state 
median household income, college and high school attainment rate, population density per square mile. State socio- 
demographic controls include the percent of the child population that is black and white; divorce rates, percent of 
the population between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption per capita; beer consumption per capita; 
population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.15 Robustness of Estimates with the Use of MML Effective Dates, by Age Cohort 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Severity of abuse Physical abuse 
rate/1,000 children 
Neglect rate/1,000 
children 
Fatality 
rate/100,000 
children 
 
Dependent variable mean 2.561 6.94 1.841 
    
MMLeffective = 1 -0.489 1.057** -0.083 
 (0.487) (0.474) (0.250) 
    
Observations 761 762 794 
Number of groups 49 49 49 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are types of maltreatment (physical abuse and neglect), per 1,000 children and child 
fatality rate per 100,000 children. MMLeffective=1 if a state’s medical marijuana provision became effective at year 
T. This table provides the coefficient estimates from the regression model in (1) estimated by FE regression. Robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are based on Driscoll-Kraay spatial-autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
 All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trends Crime rate 
controls include the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants; family and drug abuse arrest rates per 
100,000 persons; law enforcement to population ratio; female officers to population ratio; prisoner to population 
ratio. State economic control variables include unemployment rate, female labor force participation rate, and state 
median household income, college and high school attainment rate, population density per square mile. State socio- 
demographic controls include the percent of the child population that is black and white; divorce rates, percent of 
the population between the ages of 15-24 and 25-44; alcohol consumption per capita; beer consumption per capita; 
population density per sq. mile. 
  
Table 2.16 Robustness of Estimates with the Use of MML Effective Dates, by Severity of Abuse 
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